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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court partially setded a long-standing dispute
about the purpose and scope of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) when it
decided Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain at the end of its 2004 term-but in
doing so, it raised an equally important set of questions that bear
greatly on the future of ATS litigation. The ATS was enacted by the
First Congress but lay dormant until its revival by the Second Circuit
in 1980 as a tool of international human rights litigation. It provides
that district courts "shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of na-
tions."' 2 There has been considerable controversy over whether the
statute simply grants 'jurisdiction" for offenses created elsewhere, or
whether it authorizes suits to be brought directly on the basis of "the
law of nations," now commonly called customary international law
(CIL). 3
Sosa (mostly) chose the former reading, holding that the ATS is
'jurisdictional in the sense of addressing the power of the courts to
entertain certain cases concerned with a certain subject." 4 The Court
rejected as "frivolous" and "implausible" the contention that the law
allows for a wholesale incorporation of substantive CIL norms into
federal common law, 5 or that it authorizes the creation of "a new
cause of action for torts in violation of international law" that are not
otherwise actionable under U.S. statutes. 6 In this understanding, the
function of the ATS is quite modest and limited.
1 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).
2 Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). While the Supreme Court has
consistently referred to the provision as the Alien Tort Statute, it is also sometimes
called the "Alien Tort Claims Act," though there seems to be no basis for this appella-
tion, and it may even be misleading. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and
Article III, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587, 592-93 (2002) [hereinafter Bradley, Alien Tort Stat-
ute] ("Human rights advocates now commonly refer to the Statute as the 'Alien Tort
Claims Act,' a title suggesting that the Statute is more than just a jurisdictional provi-
sion."); Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 457, 457 n.3 (2001) [hereinafter Bradley, Human Rights Litigation] (noting
that there appears to be no historical basis for the "Alien Tort Claims Act"
appellation).
3 Given the voluminous pre-Sosa scholarship examining the ATS, this Article
does not consider the abstract merits of the possible interpretations of the statute.
Rather, it focuses on understanding the position taken by Sosa in this controversy and
translating Sosa into a workable test for future claims.
4 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2755 (2004).
5 Id.
6 Id. at 2772.
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However, the Court did not entirely shut down ATS human rights
litigation. Backtracking on its "only jurisdictional" interpretation, it
held out the possibility that the statute might allow judicial recogni-
tion of a narrow subset of modern CIL-based causes of action. That
subset would be those offenses substantially analogous to those for
which the First Congress specifically intended the ATS to provide ju-
risdiction. These are the three law of nations offenses described by
Blackstone as being part of common law: offenses against ambassa-
dors, violations of safe passage, and piracy.7 The Court did not say for
certain that modern CIL offenses could be brought directly under the
ATS. Nor did it set out a clear method for determining whether a CIL
norm sufficiently resembles the Blackstonian offenses, leaving the "ul-
timate criteria" for future resolution.8
While Sosa may at first glance seem open-ended (or in the words
of the dissent, "hardly ... a recipe for restraint in future cases") 9 the
inquiry that it demands is far more restrictive than may initially ap-
pear. Sosa contains the outlines of a rather demanding test to deter-
mine whether a particular international law claim can be subject to
jurisdiction under the ATS. The test is historical, requiring a close
examination of those "characteristics" of the eighteenth century of-
fenses that gave them their special status in the common law and the
law of nations. Applying this test to a variety of purported new inter-
national norms will become a significant subject of litigation in the
lower courts in the wake of Sosa,10 litigation that could result in con-
flicting decisions due to the Court's scant description of the test it
envisions.
This Article fleshes out the historical test contemplated by Sosa by
identifying the salient characteristics of the Blackstonian offenses,
which in turn become the characteristics that a CIL norm must posses
to be actionable under the ATS. These characteristics are particularly
important limiting criteria when the suit is brought by foreigners
against foreigners, a controversial use of the ATS that the Court sug-
7 Id. at 2761-62.
8 Id. at 2765.
9 For example, one of the formulations the Court used to describe the limits on
new CIL actions was that they must be "specific, universal, and obligatory." Id. at 2775
(Scalia, J., concurring). The Court found that Alvarez's arbitrary detention claim did
not satisfy this standard and thus reversed an en banc decision of the Ninth Circuit.
Yet, as Justice Scalia observes, this can only result in confusion, because "specific, uni-
versal, and obligatory" was "the very formula that led the Ninth Circuit to its result in
this case." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
10 Id. at 2776 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[I]n this illegitimate lawmaking endeavor,
the lower federal courts will be the principal actors.").
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gests should be allowed, if at all, only for norms that bear a particu-
larly close resemblance to the eighteenth century paradigms. Piracy is
jurisdictionally and conceptually most closely related to the modern
human rights offenses that have been litigated under the ATS. It was
the only universal jurisdiction (UJ) offense known to common law
and the law of nations, and thus this Article pays particular attention
to the characteristics that gave it this status. Indeed, the Court itself
emphasizes piracy as the benchmark for any judicial recognition of
new international norms, and piracy has been invoked as a model or
precedent by those who support using U.S. courts to hear cases involv-
ing human rights abuses committed by foreigners abroad.
Part I describes the controversy over the meaning of the ATS. It
then explains the confusing quasi-resolution to this controversy
reached in Sosa, and criticizes the opinion for a fundamental inconsis-
tency in its treatment of changes in the nature of CIL and federal
common law since the enactment of the ATS. This Part pays particu-
lar attention to the role of UJ in ATS litigation to date, and examines
whether Sosa itself was a UJ case or otherwise casts light on the UJ
question. Part I shows that Sosa adopts a historical test that only allows
for CIL causes of action that significantly resemble the few Black-
stonian offenses contemplated by the first Congress. Implementing
this test requires identifying the relevant characteristics of the earlier
offenses, and of piracy in particular.
Part II concerns itself with the identification of these characteris-
tics-which is in effect the construction of the specific "questions" in
the Sosa "test." As Part II shows, a combination of six characteristics
allowed piracy to become and remain a universally cognizable offense
against the law of nations. First, piracy was a crime in the municipal
law of all nations; international law merely reflected an already ubiqui-
tous condemnation of the conduct. Second, piracy had a narrow and
universally agreed on definition; the conduct it proscribed was well
understood, thus preventing conflicts between states about the propri-
ety of UJ. Third, all nations made piracy punishable by death. Thus
UJ would not lead to forvm shopping or disputes among nations as to
what punishment should be inflicted. Fourth, and perhaps most im-
portantly, pirates were private actors who had refused the protection
of their home states by failing to obtain a letter of marque, an easily-
secured authorization that would make their conduct perfectly legal.
They could expect little succor from their home state, since they had
turned their back on it, and thus a prosecuting nation would not ex-
pect the home state to take offense. Fifth, piracy occurred on the
high seas. While this did not make traditional jurisdictional limita-
tions moot, it did make conventional enforcement difficult, and thus
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UJ might seem an attractive auxiliary to domestic prosecution. Fi-
nally, pirates indiscriminately attacked the ships of all nations, as they
were not constrained by ties of national loyalty or the limitations con-
tained in a letter of marque. Thus maritime states had a particularly
strong interest in punishing pirates because their ships could fall prey
to them, and all states would be economically harmed by disruptions
of international commerce.
These six features minimized the problems and dangers that
would otherwise accompany UJ. Because piracy-and no other of-
fense-had these characteristics, a norm of universal cognizability
could emerge and persist for centuries without nations defecting
from, and thus changing, it. Other offenses possessed some of these
features, but lacking the full complement, none received the same
treatment as piracy in international law. Unlike piracy-and unlike
much of recent ATS litigation-the other two law of nations offenses
enforced by common law courts involved offenses committed by En-
glishmen within England.
Part III administers Sosa's historical "test" to modern human
rights offenses, and finds that they do not pass. New CIL norms do
not possess one or more of the important properties that made piracy
safe for UJ and enforceable by common law. Thus providing redress
for modern CIL offenses would entail profound dangers not contem-
plated by the First Congress when it enacted the ATS with the limited
purpose of allowing suits dealing with piracy, ambassadors, and safe
conducts. Comparing piracy to modern international law norms
reveals that new causes of action under the ATS cannot be created
without abandoning the fidelity to the historical paradigms mandated
by the Court. The "door" that Sosa leaves "ajar subject to vigilant
doorkeeping"'1 has nothing behind it.
I. SOSA AND THE RELEVANCE OF PIRACY TO ATS CLAIMS
A. The ATS Controversy Unresolved
The ATS came into being as part of the first Judiciary Act, which
established the federal courts and regulated their jurisdiction.12 Not
much else is known about the statute: no legislative history exists, and
there are few other contemporaneous hints about its purpose and
meaning.' " For two hundred years after its passage, the ATS lay in
11 Id. at 2764.
12 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79.
13 See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2754-55; Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,
812 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) ("The debates over the Judiciary Act in the
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desuetude.' 4 The Second Circuit resuscitated it in the landmark Filar-
tiga v. Pena-Irala'5 decision. That case involved a suit by Paraguayans
against former Paraguayan officials, alleging torture in violation of
CIL. 1 6 The court found that § 1350 gave it jurisdiction to hear the
case because it was filed "by an alien" and alleged a "violation of the
law of nations." Moreover, the Second Circuit concluded that CIL
also provides a cause of action because it believed international law to
be, in toto, "part of the federal common law."
1 7
Filartiga transformed the statute into a tool for foreigners to seek
redress in federal courts for a variety of abuses committed by govern-
ments around the world. While only a few courts of appeals adopted
the Second Circuit's view of the statute, this was enough to allow a
wide-ranging docket of ATS cases. ATS suits have sought, and often
obtained, recovery for violent repression of political dissent and other
abuses by, among others, the president of Zimbabwe,' 8 the former
president of the Philippines, 19 the former prime minister of China,
20
the 1970s leadership of Ethiopia, 21 and members of prior military re-
gimes in Nigeria 22 and Guatemala.23 Other cases involved Bosnian
women suing for mass rape organized by a Bosnian-Serb political
House-the Senate debates were not recorded-nowhere mention the provision, not
even, so far as we are aware, indirectly .... Historical research has not as yet disclosed
what section 1350 was intended to accomplish."); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001,
1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J.) ("This old but little used section is a kind of legal
Lohengrin; although it has been with us since the firstJudiciary Act... no one seems
to know whence it came.").
14 In only one case during that period did a court rely solely on the statute for
jurisdiction. See Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern UniversalJurisdiction's
Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT'L LJ. 184, 202 n.111 (2004).
15 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
16 See id. at 878.
17 Id. at 885.
18 See Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
19 See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789, 790-92 (9th Cir. 1996).
20 See Edward Wong, Chinese Leader Sued in New York Over Deaths Stemming from
Tiananmen Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2000, at A6.
21 See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845 (11th Cir. 1996) (upholding recov-
ery for the plaintiff under the ATS).
22 See Abiola v. Abubakar, 267 F. Supp. 2d 907, 907-08 (N.D. Il. 2003) (denying
the summary judgment motion of the defendant Nigerian general).
23 Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 197-98 (D. Mass. 1995) (awarding com-
pensatory and punitive damages against Guatemalan generals under the ATS).
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leader,24 and claims against the Japanese government for using Asian
women as sex slaves during the Second World War. 25
In another branch of ATS litigation, foreigners have sued foreign
and American corporations for violating international human rights
and environmental norms in their operations abroad, or abetting
such violations by foreign governments. 26 These suits may be more
financially promising for plaintiffs, as they do not face sovereign im-
munity obstacles and multinational corporations probably have more
assets in the United States with which to satisfy a judgment than a
general of a deposed Third World regime. Given the widespread use
of torture, murder, and political repression by the governments of the
world, the ATS cases represented but a small fraction of what could
have been brought under Filartiga's broad construction of the statute.
The limiting factors may have been foreigners' ignorance of the
unique and novel opportunities afforded them in U.S. courts, or their
lack of access to them, perhaps as a result of the very repression of
which they might complain.2 7
While Filartiga reached its conclusions about the ATS somewhat
casually, the subsequent wave of litigation led scholars to consider
§ 1350 quite closely. A substantial corpus of scholarship has arisen
around the statute. The commentary can be roughly sorted into four
different interpretations, two focusing on the statute as a source of
substantive law, and two viewing it as jurisdictional only. At one ex-
treme was the full-blown "cause of action theory" under which the stat-
ute provided jurisdiction and allowed for common law causes of
action for international law violations not limited to those known in
24 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995) (reversing dismissal of a suit
under the ATS).
25 Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 332 F.3d 679, 680-81 (D.C. Cir. 2003), vacated by
124 S. Ct. 2835 (2004).
26 See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2000)
(upholding jurisdiction over a suit by a Nigerian national against Dutch and British
firms for supporting human rights abuses by Nigerian authorities); Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(denying the defendant Canadian energy company's motion to dismiss a complaint
accusing it of complicity in the Sudanese government's ethnic cleansing campaign);
Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that the
ATS provides jurisdiction and a cause of action in a suit by Papua New Guineans
alleging environmental and human rights abuses by an international mining
company).
27 Cf Van Tu v. Koster, 364 F.3d 1196, 1199-200 (10th Cir. 2004) ("We agree
with the district court that ... some degree of equitable tolling w[as] appropriate on
the basis of plaintiffs' [Vietnamese villagers'] poverty, their status as subjects of a
Communist government, the Vietnam War, and their inability to travel.").
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1789.28 A narrower interpretation saw the statute as affording a cause
of action, but one locked into the particular content of the 1789 law
of nations, and not continuously updated by developments in CIL.29
On the other side of the debate, scholars argued that the statute was
purely jurisdictional and could not be the basis for any common law
recognition of international offenses. One version of this interpreta-
tion saw jurisdiction as extending to suits between aliens,30 while a
narrower reading found it to apply only to suits against American na-
tionals.31 Sosa was the Supreme Court's first encounter with these
questions. 32 Like Santa Claus, the Court's opinion brought some-
thing for everyone. Of the four major interpretations developed by
scholars, Sosa partially endorses the first,3- as well as the second, 34 and
the third,35 and perhaps the fourth.36
28 See, e.g., Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A
Badge of Honor, 83 Am. J. INr'L L. 461, 489-93 (1989); Anthony D'Amato, The Alien
Tort Statute and the Founding of the Constitution, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 62, 62 n.4 (1988);
William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the
"Originalists, " 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 221, 224 (1996); Kenneth C. Ran-
dall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute,
18 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 41-42 (1985).
29 See, e.g., Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations,
18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 445, 446-47 (1995) (arguing that the statute was
designed to allow for redress of violations of prize law).
30 See Bradley, Alien Tort Statute, supra note 2, at 626-29.
31 Id. at 630-37.
32 Between Filartiga and Sosa, the Court had only heard one case brought under
§ 1350. However, it did not have occasion to interpret the ATS in that case. Because
a foreign state was the defendant, the Court ruled that the action could only be
brought, if at all, under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1330-1331, 1602-1611 (2000), and not the ATS. See Argentine Republic v. Amer-
ada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
33 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2773 (2004) (refusing to "close
the door to further independent judicial recognition of actionable international
norms" under the ATS).
34 Id. at 2761-62 (holding that Congress only intended to allow actions for the
three Blackstonian offenses, and if a present-day CIL norm can be actionable under
ATS, it must resemble those offenses).
35 Id. at 2764 ("All members of the Court agree that section 1350 is only
jurisdictional.").
36 Id. at 2763 (noting that even if a new CIL norm is cognizable under the ATS, it
is quite another thing for federal courts "to consider suits ... that would go so far as
to claim a limit on the power of foreign governments over their own citizens, and to
hold that a foreign government has transgressed these limits").
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B. Sosa's Holding: A Historical Test
1. The Background to Sosa
Sosa was the second case in which the Mexican national
Humberto Alvarez-Machain gave the Court occasion to elaborate on
the obscure relationship between American and international law;
both cases involve the same facts. In 1985, a Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration agent was tortured and murdered in Mexico. U.S. offi-
cials believed that Alvarez participated in the crime by keeping the
agent alive so as to prolong his agony. Alvarez was indicted by a fed-
eral grand jury, but Mexico refused an extradition request. This
prompted the DEA to abduct Alvarez from Mexico, bringing him to
the United States to stand trial. Sosa is a Mexican national recruited
by the DFA to carry out the Mexican side of the operation. 37 Alvarez
challenged the federal court's jurisdiction over him on the grounds
that the process that brought him before the court was illegal, in viola-
tion of the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico.
The case ultimately went to the Supreme Court, which held that the
abduction did not violate the treaty because the treaty dealt with ex-
traditions and had nothing to say one way or another about abduc-
tions outside the extradition process.38
Alvarez was subsequently tried before ajury in a California district
court, but before the jury could deliver a verdict the judge entered an
acquittal for Alvarez on the grounds that the government had with-
held potentially exculpatory evidence and failed to bring him before a
magistrate promptly upon bringing him into the country.39 Free from
prosecution, Alvarez turned around and filed a civil action based on
his kidnapping against the DEA, several agents, as well as Sosa and
other Mexican nationals who assisted in the abduction. He sought
damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against the gov-
ernmental actors (the United States was eventually substituted for the
individual agents). He also sued Sosa under the ATS, claiming that
his seizure and abduction constituted a tort in violation of the law of
nations. The various cases were consolidated on appeal, and the
37 Id. at 2746.
38 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 664-66 (1992). The Court also
rejected the contention that the treaty should be interpreted in light of a CIL norm
against cross-border abductions; in doing so, it seemed to implicitly conclude that
such an international norm, if it exists, would not of its own force give justiciable
rights or defenses to individuals. Id. at 666-69.
39 See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1996).
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Ninth Circuit upheld the claim of illegal detention (but not cross-bor-
der abduction) under the ATS and FTCA.40
2. The Supreme Court's Holding
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the
ATS is a jurisdictional statute that does not incorporate by reference
all of substantive international law as possible causes of action. For
specific international law norms to be actionable, Congress must pass
specific implementing legislation. If this were all Sosa held, the deci-
sion would be easy to understand and to apply, for only one statute
currently in force creates a cause of action for violations of human
rights abroad.41 Yet the Court took an additional step that will pro-
duce much litigation in the lower courts. It suggested that a "narrow
set" of international law violations are directly actionable under the
otherwise purely jurisdictional statute. After examining the statute's
history, the Court concluded that Congress passed the ATS assuming
it could be used immediately, without further legislation, to hear a
"very limited set of claims" alleging violations of the specific law of
nations norms that were also part of common law:
In sum, although the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new
causes of action, the reasonable inference from the historical mater-
ials is that the statute was intended to have practical effect the mo-
ment it became law. The jurisdictional grant is best read as having
been enacted on the understanding that the common law would
provide a cause of action for the modest number of international
law violations with a potential for personal liability at the time [i.e.,
Blackstone's three offenses].42
Again, had the Court gone no further, the decision would be easy
to implement. ATS cases since Filartiga have not involved ambassa-
dors, safe conducts, or pirates, and thus causes of action would still in
practice be confined to those granted by the Torture Victim Protec-
tion Act (TVPA). Yet, although the Court acknowledged that there is
"no basis to suspect" that the First Congress wished to allow any other
law of nations offenses to be directly actionable, and had grounded its
conclusions thus far in a reconstruction of legislative intent, it none-
40 In Sosa, the Supreme Court reversed the FTCAjudgment on the grounds that
the statute does not waive sovereign immunity for claims "arising in a foreign coun-
try." Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2747. This Article focuses exclusively on the ATS portion of
the Sosa decision.
41 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)
(creating a civil action for extrajudicial killing and torture under color of foreign
law).
42 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761.
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theless went on to say that federal courts may be able to create causes
of action for a narrow subset of new international law offenses. The
question left open is what, if anything, falls in that subset.
Sosa makes clear that the test is historical. The ATS only provides
jurisdiction over those new CIL offenses that significantly resemble
the "historical paradigms" contemplated by the First Congress. It is
not enough for an offense to be recognized by today's CIL. Rather, it
must violate CIL in a way that connects it to the concerns manifest in
the eighteenth century offenses described by Blackstone and contem-
plated by Congress. As the Court put it, a claim under the ATS must
share the "characteristics" of the "relatively modest set of actions alleg-
ing violations of the law of nations" offenses43 that the statute sought
to furnish jurisdiction for.44 Establishing what modern CIL offenses
can be brought under ATS will thus require analogizing to the "histor-
ical paradigms." To do this, one must first identify the "features of the
18th century paradigms.
45
The Court mentioned two of the features that a modern interna-
tional law offense must share with piracy and the other eighteenth
century models. The international norm must be near universal in its
acceptance, 46 and the conduct it prohibits must be defined with con-
siderable specificity.4 7 Arbitrary arrest and detention, the interna-
tional law norm at play in Sosa, did not qualify under the "clear
definition" criterion. So the Court did not have an occasion to ex-
plore all of the characteristics of piracy relevant to its status as offense
against the law of nations in the eighteenth century. But the Court
made clear that specificity and widespread acceptance do not exhaust
the limiting principles implicit in the historical paradigms. 48 For ex-
ample, Sosa suggests that whether the CIL norm limits liability to pri-
vate actors could be another limitation. 49 Identifying all of the
relevant "features" will be essential to navigating post-Sosa litigation in
the lower courts.
43 Id. at 2759.
44 Id. at 2761.
45 Id. at 2761-62.
46 Id. (limiting ATS jurisdiction to international law norms "accepted by the civi-
lized world").
47 Id. at 2761-62, 2765-66.
48 Id. at 2766 n.21 ("This requirement of clear definition is not meant to be the
only principle limiting the availability of relief in federal courts for violations of cus-
tomary international law, though it disposes of this case.").
49 Id. at 2766 n.20.
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3. The Court's Inconsistency
Sosa managed to embrace at least three of the four competing
interpretations of the ATS only through a major inconsistency in its
treatment of twentieth century transformations in the nature of CIL
and federal common law. On one hand, the Court concludes that
Congress meant the ATS to accommodate radical changes in the law
of nations, even a change as fundamental as the shift from classic in-
ternational law, which dealt primarily with relations between states, to
modern international law, which deals largely with the treatment by
states of their internal populations. While today's "international law"
is an entirely different creature from the "law of nations" mentioned
in the 1789 Judiciary Act, the Court suggests that Act may track exter-
nal developments. 50
Not so when it comes to changes in the understanding of the
nature of law itself, and their bearing on the power of federal courts.
Since Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,5' federal courts have been incapa-
ble of creating common law, because, in the modern understanding,
such law is not discovered but made, and is thus a legislative function
beyond the limited power of the Article IIIjudiciary. 52 Thus CIL can-
not be recognized as part of federal common law without separate
legislative authorization. 53 Yet according to Sosa, the understanding
of common law-making power that is to guide implementation of the
ATS is not today's understanding, but something closer to the 1789
understanding. 54 While the Court says the First Congress understood
that its entire conception of the proper provenance of the law of na-
50 Id. at 2761-62 (holding out the possibility that the ATS authorizes claims
"based on the present-day law of nations").
51 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
52 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2762, 2764.
53 For the argument that Erie precludes recognition of CIL as part of federal com-
mon law, see Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 847-55
(1997).
54 See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761 ("[N]o development in the two centuries from the
enactment of § 1350 to the birth of the modern line of cases beginning with Filartiga
... has categorically precluded federal courts from recognizing a claim under the 'law
of nations' as an element of common law."); see also id. at 2764 ("Erie did not in terms
bar any judicial recognition of new substantive rules, no matter what the circum-
stances."). But see id. at 2773 (Scalia, J., concurring).
[T]he creation of post-Erie federal common law is rooted in a positivist
mindset utterly foreign to the American common-law tradition of the late
18th century. Post-Erie federal common lawmaking (all that is left to the
federal courts) is so far removed from that general-common-law adjudica-
tion which applied the law of nations that it would be anachronistic to find
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tions might be overthrown, and would want the ATS to adapt to such
changes, the Court refuses to ascribe to Congress any such intention
with regard to changes in federal common law.
The inconsistent treatment of these two developments suggests a
result-driven reasoning. There are two consistent interpretations of
the effect of changes in the nature of international and federal com-
mon law on the scope of the ATS. Either consistent interpretation
would have doomed modern ATS litigation. One consistent treat-
ment would find that while both common law and international law
stand on a different footing today than in 1789, courts applying the
statute today should use the modern understanding of common and
international law. While this would mean that new human rights of-
fenses are legitimately part of the "law of nations" within the meaning
of the statute, federal courts would not be able to recognize causes of
action based on them. On the other hand, the Court could have held
that the ATS preserves the 1789 understandings of both international
law and the common lawmaking powers of federal courts. Under this
result, federal courts would be able to recognize enforceable interna-
tional norms absent congressional action-but these norms would be
limited to unexciting things like offenses against ambassadors. The
Court could only avoid killing off human rights litigation in U.S.
courts by finding that the ATS preserves the federal courts' common
lawmaking power as it stood in the eighteenth century, while allowing
the scope and subjects of that power to keep pace with the organic
growth of CIL norms. And that is precisely what the Court decided.
It managed to reach this puzzling result by repeatedly invoking
an imagined legislative intent. Yet even assuming such a thing as legis-
lative intent exists, 55 it seems improbable that one can reconstruct any
congressional expectations about the impact of radical developments
the earliest of which came 145 years after the passage of the relevant
statute. It makes no sense to speculate about what the First Congress
would have "expected" to happen if the "common law might loose
some metaphysical cachet on the road to modern realism. ' 56 Since
the First Congress did not expect the usurpation of their jurispruden-
tial worldview, it is hard to say that they would have any definite no-
tion as to what should happen in such an event, or even much cared.
authorization to do the former in a statutory grant of jurisdiction that was
thought to enable the latter.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
55 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544-48
(1983); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They, "Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymo-
ron, 12 INT'L REN'. L. & ECON. 239, 254 (1992).
56 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2765.
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Nor can one coherently deduce from the ATS what Congress would
have wanted to happen if the content of "the law of nations" changed
radically. Ascribing to the First Congress intentions regarding a con-
tingency it certainly did not anticipate allows the Court to promote its.
current intent.
C. Sosa and U
A unique and controversial component of ATS litigation has been
the exercise of UJ by U.S. courts.57 Filartiga, which spawned modern
ATS litigation, relied on UJ.58 In international law, a country's juris-
diction is based on and congruent with the scope of its sovereign
power. States only have jurisdiction over crimes committed within
their territory (known as territorial jurisdiction), or by or against their
nationals (nationality and passive-personality jurisdiction). 59 UJ is a
57 See Robert H. Bork, Judicial Imperialism, WALL ST.J., July 12, 2004, at Al6 ("The
expansion of ATS so that our courts can judge the actions of foreigners in their own
countries is a version of the embryonic concept of universal jurisdiction.").
58 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885-87 (2d Cir. 1980).
59 See Kontorovich, supra note 14, at 188-89 (explaining the different categories
ofjurisdiction in international law). Courts and commentators also sometimes invoke
the "protective principle," under which states can punish activities committed by for-
eigners abroad that cause serious harm in the prosecuting state. See LIAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 307 (5th ed. 1998); Louis HENKIN, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 238-39, (1995). The scope of the protective princi-
ple is uncertain and controversial, because under loose notions of harm and
causation it could encompass a wide variety of extraterritorial conduct and ultimately
shade into UJ. See Kontorovich, supra note 14, at 190. Nonetheless, U.S. courts have
sustained some exercises of the protective principle, particularly in antitrust and drug
trafficking cases. E.g., United States v. Alomia-Riascos, 825 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1987).
The protective principle of international law permits a nation to assert sub-
ject matter criminal jurisdiction over a person whose conduct outside the
nation's territory threatens the national interest. Thus under international
law the United States could exercise criminal subject matter jurisdiction over
foreign nationals for possession of large quantities of narcotics on foreign
vessels upon the high seas, even in the absence of a treaty or arrangement.
Id. at 771 (citations omitted). One possible limitation on the protective principle
involves the gravity or nature of the harm-the prosecuting nation's "security" must
be at stake. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 110 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Yousef's prose-
cution [for planning to blow up a commercial airliner] by the United States is consis-
tent with the 'protective principle' of international law. The protective (or 'security')
principle permits a State to assume jurisdiction over non-nationals for acts done
abroad that affect the security of the State."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW § 402(3) cmt. f (1987) (suggesting that the protective principle applies
only to conduct "directed against the security of the state or other offenses threaten-
ing the integrity of governmental functions that are generally recognized as crimes by
developed legal systems"). However, "security" also proves to be an elastic concept
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narrow exception to these sovereignty-based principles, under which
certain crimes can be prosecuted by any nation, even if the forum
state has no connection with the offense. 6
0
While there are arguments about which CIL offenses qualify as
universal, the oft-mentioned candidates include the human rights of-
fenses that have been litigated under the ATS-torture, war crimes,
and genocide.61 While UJ holds out the promise of bringing perpetra-
tors of atrocious crimes to justice, it can also work much mischief.
Assertions of UJ by one nation can be perceived as interference in the
internal affairs of other countries. This can strain diplomatic relations
and lead to interstate conflict. As a result, UJ over human rights of-
fenses remains controversial. Only a few European nations have dab-
bled with UJ.62 None appear ready to make a habit of it, and some
nations that were at the forefront of UJ have disowned their tentative
experiments. 63 Depending on how lower courts interpret Sosa, the
that has been held to encompass extraterritorial drug trafficking. United States v.
Gonzalez, 311 F.3d 440, 446 (1st Cir. 2002) ("Congress obtains authority to regulate
drug trafficking on the high seas under the 'protective principle' of international law,
which permits a nation to assert jurisdiction over a person whose conduct outside the
nation's territory threatens the nation's security.") (citation omitted).
60 See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 371 (E.D. La. 1997)
("Where a state has universal jurisdiction, it may punish conduct although the state
has no links of territoriality or nationality with the offender or victim." (quoting RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 404 cmt. a (1987))); see also Curtis
A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323, 323-24
(describing UJ as jurisdiction with no "nexus between the regulating nation and the
conduct, offender, or victim").
61 See Bradley, supra note 60, at 324 & n.7 ("Although there is some debate over
what additional offenses are now subject to universal jurisdiction, most scholars seem
to agree that it extends to the slave trade, genocide, war crimes, and torture.");
Kontorovich, supra note 14, at 206-07 (describing methods of selecting modern uni-
versal offenses).
62 See Luc REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LE-
GAL PERSPECTIVES 88-219 (2003) (surveying UJ legislation and cases in many nations
around the world and finding only twenty cases in the past ten years).
63 Spain, for example, drew attention and interest to UJ in 1998 when it re-
quested the extradition of Chilean General Augusto Pinochet from Britain under a
Spanish law that seemed to authorize UJ over certain gross human rights abuses. See
Luis Benavides, Introductory Note to the Supreme Court of Spain:Judgment on the Guatema-
lan Genocide Case, 42 I.L.M. 683 (2003). But last year, Spain's Supreme Court, in a
case involving massive human rights abuses in Guatemala, completely repudiated UJ.
Reversing lower tribunals, it held that Spain will not assert UJ over genocide. See id. at
686. For foreign human rights abuses to be justiciable in Spanish courts, there must
be a "direct link to a national Spanish interest in regard to this crime." Id. at 701.
Such a link is necessary to "legitimize" the prosecution, id., because it could otherwise
be seen as an encroachment on the other nation's sovereignty, id. at 697. Belgium
was another pioneer of UJ that has since retreated. In 1993, it passed a law authoriz-
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United States may turn out to be the nation that most frequently and
broadly exercises UJ. So while Sosa holds that the ATS gives federal
courts jurisdiction, a separate question is how much jurisdiction it
gives; that is, whether it authorizes universal jurisdiction. If the ATS
grants UJ to the federal courts, this would raise the further question of
whether such ajurisdictional grant would be consistent with Article III
of the Constitution.64
1. Sosa as a UJ Case
Sosa itself may involve UJ-but only in the most narrow and
technical sense. Both the plaintiff and the defendant were foreign
nationals. Thus the case would not fall into either the national
or passive-personality bases of international jurisdiction. The
substantive conduct is more difficult to classify. The alleged tort
involved the seizure of Alvarez in Mexico and his kidnapping into
the United States. The Ninth Circuit ruled that only the actions
committed within Mexico-the detention-constituted a tort
and so the case arose entirely outside of U.S. territory.65
ing UJ over certain crimes, and in 2001 even convicted four Rwandan nuns for partici-
pating in that country's genocide. See Stefaan Smis & KimVan Der Borght,
Introductory Note to Belgium's Amendment to the Law of June 16, 1993 (As Amended By the
Law of February 10, 1999) Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of Humanitarian
Law, 42 I.L.M. 740, 741 & n.21 (2003). But in response to foreign relations problems
caused by UJ cases against foreign leaders, Belgium severely pared back the UJ law.
See Platrick Lannin, Belgium to Scrap War Crimes Law, WASH. POST,July 13, 2003, atA19
(reporting that Belgium's elimination of UJ in cases brought by private parties was a
response to claims against Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, British Prime Minister
Tony Blair, and President George W. Bush). Privately-initiated cases alleging human
rights abuses-the equivalent of ATS cases-now require a direct connection with
Belgium either on the part of the victim or offender. See Smis & Van Der Borght,
supra, at 743. Public prosecutions are restricted to situations in which the defendant's
home state or international tribunals are incapable of dealing with the matter. Id. at
744.
64 The constitutional question is beyond the scope of this Article. However, it
bears noting that UJ would be unsupportable if the ATS is an implementation of
Article III's alienagejurisdiction, as opposed to federal question jurisdiction, because
foreigners are not diverse from foreigners. See Bradley, Alien Tort Statute, supra note 2,
at 634-37 (arguing that the ATS implements Article III's alienage jurisdiction, which
requires a U.S. citizen on one side of the case).
65 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2748 (2004) ("In the Ninth Circuit's
view, once Alvarez was within the borders of the United States, his detention was not
tortious .... Alvarez's arrest... was said to be 'false,' and thus tortious, only because,
and only to the extent that, it took place and endured in Mexico.").
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If so, the case can not be grounded in territorial jurisdiction
either.66
Yet all this ignores the substantial U.S. connection to the case.
The detention and abduction were conceived of and planned in the
United States by agents of the U.S. government. The purpose was to
bring Alvarez to the United States to stand trial-for the murder and
torture of a U.S. law enforcement agent. Indeed, Alvarez's suit was in
spirit a civil "counterclaim" to the failed prosecution against him-a
case over which the United States certainly had jurisdiction. Thus the
nexus between the second Alvarez case and the United States appears
quite tight. Moreover, it is not clear how much bearing the Ninth
Circuit's determination that the tort arose entirely in Mexico should
have on the procedural question of whether the case falls within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States under international law.
The Ninth Circuit based its holding on substantive principles of tort
law; it did not deny that the case had a substantial relationship to the
United States, and indeed, in the FTCA section of its ruling, it stressed
this relationship. 67
The set of facts relevant to determining whether an offense falls
within territorial jurisdiction as opposed to UJ may be broader than
those that determine where a tort arose for choice of law and FTCA
purposes. In other words, the fact that the cross-border aspect of the
abduction may not have been independently tortuous does not mean
that the cross-border aspect cannot serve to establish territorial juris-
diction. Indeed, looking at the U.S. connections would be consistent
with the principle that jurisdictional facts can be broader than, and
distinct from, those necessary to make out a case for relief. It would
take a blinkered view of the case to consider it a strong precedent for
UJ under the ATS.
At most, Sosa is akin to pseudo-universal jurisdiction cases such as
the Nuremberg prosecutions and the Eichmann case. 68 These famous
war crimes prosecutions are not pure UJ cases, although they are
often cited as precedents supporting current efforts to universalize ju-
risdiction over human rights cases. While the Allied war crimes tribu-
nals did invoke concepts of universality, 69 they were clearly not
strangers to the crimes they were prosecuting. They had established a
strong nexus with the offenses by fighting and winning the war in
66 Id. at 2783 (Breyer, J., concurring) (observing that the "underlying substantive
claim" arose "outside the United States" and suggesting that only the universal princi-
ple of jurisdiction can sustain the case).
67 Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 637-41 (9th Cir. 2003).
68 Eichmann v. Atty. Gen., 36 I.L.R. 277 (S. Ct. Isr. 1962).
69 See Kontorovich, supra note 14, at 195 & n.64.
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which the enemies' war crimes had been committed; moreover, as the
occupying powers, they succeeded to the prosecutorial prerogatives of
the defeated nations, and thus could be said to be simply exercising
territorial jurisdiction. 70 Eichmann is similar. While the Israeli Su-
preme Court invoked universal principles, 71 it was clear that Israel's
interest in Eichmann's crimes was not random. Israel acted as the
only sovereign representative of the Jewish people,72 and the only rea-
son it might not havejurisdiction under the standard categories is that
Eichmann's crimes predated the state's creation. One can quibble
about whether these cases deserve to be called exercises of "universal
jurisdiction," though it seems hypertechnical to ignore the substantial
connection Israel and the Allies had with the crimes, connections that
were in fact superior in quantity and quality to those of any other
state. Whether one calls this UJ or not, such cases provide inadequate
precedent for full-blown UJ of the Filartiga variety.
2. Sosa as a UJ Holding
Whether or not hearing Sosa's claims required exercising UJ, the
Court's opinion does not explicitly address the UJ question.73 In-
stead, the Court ruled that there is no jurisdiction over Sosa's substan-
tive claim of abduction regardless of where it occurred or who the
parties were: the substantive norm itself is insufficiently definite to fall
within the small set of CIL offenses actionable under the ATS. The
question that the Court answered in the affirmative-whether the ATS
confers jurisdiction over cases brought by aliens suing under certain
causes of action created by CIL-is distinct from the question of
whether the ATS grants the district courts universal jurisdiction over
such offenses. The UJ question would only arise if the norm was found
to be actionable. Then the Court would have had to make the further
determination of whether the ATS contemplates purely UJ suits-
70 See id. at 195.
71 See Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 292, 299-300 (describing piracy as a "classic" UJ of-
fense that provides precedent for UJ over war crimes).
72 Indeed, Eichmann was convicted of "crimes against the Jewish people" in addi-
tion to the more general "crimes against humanity," demonstrating that Israel had a
specific, unique, and differentiable stake in his punishment. See Kontorovich, supra
note 14, at 197.
73 Justice Breyer's opinion is the only one to directly address the UJ question. He
believes that entertaining Alvarez's claim would require exercising UJ, which he felt
would be inappropriate, though he also holds out the possibility that it might be
proper for some other claims that could be brought under the ATS. Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2783 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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ones with no connection to the United States other than the plaintiffs
decision to sue here-to redress violations of such norms.
CIL both creates the offenses actionable under the ATS and also
deems some of them universally cognizable. But under international
law, the exercise of UJ over universal offenses is not mandatory.
74
Thus it is entirely consistent to import causes of action from CIL into
federal common law without granting district courts UJ over such
claims. Indeed, other nations have incorporated international law of-
fenses into their criminal codes but require a traditional basis ofjuris-
diction for prosecution. UJ does not automatically accompany human
rights offenses when they become part of a nation's substantive law.
Moreover, since the Court ruled that the ATS's jurisdictional grant is
distinct from the causes of action it borrows from international law,
75
it need not track international law notions of jurisdiction. To give a
concrete example, although Sosa holds that the ATS confers a private
right of action for "infringement of the rights of ambassadors,"
76 it
gives no reason to believe that district courts can hear a case brought
against, say, Mali, by the Ghanaian ambassador to that country, and
alleging harassment at the hands of Mali.
Furthermore, Sosa sounded a cautionary note that suggests at
least a strong presumption against UJ, described by the Court as
"suits . . . that would go so far as to claim a limit on the power of
foreign governments over their citizens."77 District courts should be
"particularly wary" of allowing ATS cases that might have "implica-
tions" for U.S. foreign relations. 78  "New norms of international
law"-which overlap significantly with the roster of purported UJ of-
fenses-are particularly likely to "raise risks of adverse foreign policy
consequences." 79 UJ cases present precisely these risks.80 The defen-
dant's home state may see ajudgment from a country with no stake in
the dispute as officious intermeddling, while the plaintiffs home state
(if different from the defendant's) may regard UJ suits in foreign
74 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987) (not-
ing that under UJ states "may" prosecute certain offenses); Bruce Broomhall, Towards
the Development of an Effective System of UniversalJurisdiction for Crimes Under International
Law, 35 NEW ENG. L. REv. 399, 404-06 (2001);Johan D. van der Vyver, Personal and
Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1, 72
(2000) ("[U] niversal jurisdiction has traditionally been interpreted to be permissive
and not mandatory.").
75 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2763-64.
76 Id. at 2756.
77 Id. at 2763.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 See Bradley, Human Rights Litigation, supra note 2, at 460-64.
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courts as a usurpation of a sovereign's prerogative to secure justice for
its nationals.8 ' As Judge Bork has noted: "When U.S. courts begin to
judge actions taken by foreigners in their own countries, the result is
not to avoid tensions but [to] exacerbate them."8 2 It is precisely such
concerns about giving offense to foreign nations that have until re-
cently entirely deterred American judges from entertaining UJ suits.8 3
Sosa makes clear that these concerns have not been diminished by
81 Indeed, the Supreme Court illustrated the risks of exercising UJ over ATS cases
by pointing to pending class actions against multinational corporations "alleged to
have participated in, or abetted the regime of apartheid that formerly controlled
South Africa." Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766. That litigation has drawn protests from the
present South African government. See In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 238
F. Supp. 2d 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2002). South Africa is not particularly solicitous of those
who abetted the former regime, but believes such litigation will upset its domestic
amnesty process. Such a complaint shows that there are many ways to step on other
countries' toes.
82 See Bork, supra note 57.
83 See, e.g., United States v. LaJeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822)
(No. 15,551) (StoryJ.).
[T]here is also a protest filed by the French consul against the jurisdiction of
the court, upon the ground, that this is a French vessel, owned by French
subjects, and, as such, exclusively liable to the jurisdiction of the French
tribunals .... I am fully aware of the importance and difficulty of this case,
considered under some of the aspects, in which it has been presented to the
court. The case has already, as we are informed, and truly, become the sub-
.ject of diplomatic intercourse between our government and that of
France ....
I feel myself at perfect liberty, with the express consent of our own govern-
ment, to decree, that the property be delivered over to the consular agent of
the king of France, to be dealt with according to his own sense of duty and
right. No one can be more sensible than myself of the real magnitude and
intricacy of the questions involved in this cause .... [T] he American courts
of judicature are not hungry after jurisdiction in foreign causes .... If I
could have had my choice of causes, this class is not that, which would have
been selected from peculiar favour.
Id. at 840, 851; see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 813 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (arguing that the ATS does not authorize "our courts
[to] sit in judgment of the conduct of foreign officials in their own countries with
respect to their own citizens"); Bork, supra note 57.
[I]t would have been preposterous for a small, weak nation clinging to the
Atlantic seaboard to have given jurisdiction to its courts to entertain, for
example, human-rights suits by Britons against the British crown for actions
taken in Britain. Rather than soothing foreign nations ... such tort actions
would have inflamed them.
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developments in CIL, and should continue to deter judges from as-
serting UJ.
However, some language in Sosa leaves the door "ajar" for asser-
tions of UJ under the ATS.84 The Court cautions that ATS cases with
implications for foreign relations should be heard "if at all, with great
caution." 85 The "if at all" may bolster judges inclined to followJustice
Story's admonition "not rashly to engage in asserting jurisdiction over
foreign causes."86 However, those judges who wish to provide redress
for massive human rights offenses are unlikely to consider themselves
reckless. 87 If they choose to continue entertaining such cases, they
would doubtless think they are acting with due caution. Sosa also sym-
pathetically cites the influential passage from Filartiga that derives, by
analogy, UJ over torture from the UJ that historically applied only to
piracy.88 So until the Court revisits the ATS to rule on the UJ issue,
some lower courts will probably continue to allow the statute to be
used as a vehicle for foreign plaintiffs to file suit in the United States
for torts unrelated in any way to the United States. 89
84 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2763.
85 Id. at 2764.
86 LaJeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. at 851.
87 Professor Bradley has described the appeal of human rights litigation to fed-
eral judges in these terms:
It is ... easy to see the attractions of this litigation for some federal judges.
In many cases, there is little dispute that egregious conduct has occurred....
Furthermore, federal judges may perceive that if they do not pass judgment
on this conduct, no one will. And the general unenforceability of their judg-
ments in these cases may actually give judges and juries more freedom to
express their moral condemnation of this conduct. In short, federal judges
may perceive that these cases offer them a rather unadulterated vehicle for
"doing justice."
Bradley, Human Rights Litigation, supra note 2, at 459 (citation omitted). In other
words, the judges are moved by the "odium" of the conduct-the very motive that
Justice Story suggested should not make the federal judiciary "hungry after jurisdic-
tion in foreign causes." LaJeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. at 851.
88 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2765-66 ("[F]or purposes of civil liability, the torturer has
become-like the pirate and slave trader before him- hostis humani generis, an enemy
of all mankind." (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980))).
89 The only case to have applied the Sosa test at the time of this writing (October
2004) dismissed a claim of a violation of international law arising from the displace-
ment of a relative's remains as part of a Holocaust memorial constructed at a death
camp in Poland. See Weiss v. Am. Jewish Comm., No. 03 Civ. 5727 (JES), 2004 WL
2072080, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2004). However, it is not likely that this claim
would have been recognized under the ATS even before Sosa.
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D. Piracy as the Benchmark for ATS Suits
Of the three eighteenth century offenses cited by the Court,
piracy is the closest (which is not to say close) eighteenth century ana-
log to modern human rights offenses. Thus its characteristics will be
most relevant to identifying the subset of CIL norms actionable under
the ATS. The Court placed special emphasis on piracy as a historical
model, citing a piracy case to illustrate the proposition that actionable
norms must be defined with specificity.9 0 Piracy's unique status as the
benchmark for ATS claims is emphasized in Justice Breyer's concur-
rence, which cast the Court's holding in these terms: " [T] o qualify for
recognition under the ATS a norm of international law" must share
the features that "characterized 18th century norms prohibiting
piracy."9 1 The law of piracy is uniquely relevant to ATS litigation be-
cause of its procedural aspects as much as its substantive content.9 2
Piracy was both the paradigmatic offense against the law of nations,
and also the original UJ offense-the one for which UJ was created.
1. Safe Conducts and Offenses Against Ambassadors
The policies underlying the common law's enforcement of the
international norms concerning safe conducts and ambassadors in-
volved considerations quite different from those present in modern
human rights litigation. The Blackstonian offenses were committed
within the forum state against foreign nationals. 93 The offenses risked
vexing foreign states because they were committed against foreigners
whom the forum state had promised to protect, and in the case of
ambassadors, who had high status in the foreign states' governments.
Such offenses at best threaten "serious consequences in international
affairs" and if not "adequately redressed could rise to an issue of
war."'9 4 Clearly "adequate redress" can only be provided by that nation
where the ambassador was molested, or the safe conducts violated-a
UJ prosecution by a third-party state would do nothing to repair rela-
tions between the injuring and victim states.
90 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2765-66 (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
153 (1820)).
91 Id. at 2782 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Significantly, Justice
Breyer makes no mention of ambassadors and safe passages as relevant to the selec-
tion of today's CIL norms actionable under the ATS.
92 Id. at 2782-83 (Breyer, J., concurring).
93 Id. at 2782 (Breyer, J., concurring).
94 Id. at 2756; see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68 (explaining that
these norms are enforced by English law because if such offenses against foreigners
went unpunished it could "involve the two states in war").
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As both Blackstone and Sosa recognize, of the many law of na-
tions offenses that existed in the eighteenth century, these few were
recognized by common law because they implicated the parochial in-
terests of England. That these offenses happened to violate the law of
nations was not sufficient for the common law to take cognizance of
them. Rather, as Sosa concedes, common law courts only enforced
international norms when doing so furthered the self-interest of the
sovereign. 95 The common law enforced these norms, Blackstone ex-
plains, to maintain the Crown's amicable relations with the victims'
home states, and in the case of safe conducts, which were often issued
to merchants, to protect Britain's commerce.9 6 Indeed, these offenses
were punished as treasons against the king. Judicial enforcement of
these norms preserved the legislature and executive's control of foreign
relations by preventing private parties from thrusting the kingdom
into war through their unilateral activities.
For ATS purposes, these two offenses can-at most-only provide
a historical analog for violations of international law committed by
Americans. They provide no precedent for the redress in American
courts of human rights violations committed by foreigners abroad.
Surely American relations with Paraguay would not be strained if U.S.
courts refused to hear Filartiga; no "issue of war" could have arisen
from an American court's declining jurisdiction over a suit by Chinese
nationals against the Chinese leadership. To the contrary, asserting
UJ over CIL norms may imperil the forum nation's relations with
other states, precisely the consequence that common law enforcement
of the ambassadors and safe conducts norms sought to avoid.
These historical analogs differ fundamentally in their "character-
istics" from CIL claims raised against U.S. defendants under the ATS.
Such claims have fallen into two categories: claims against the govern-
ment or official actors,97 and claims against U.S. corporations, usually
alleging complicity in human rights abuses by foreign governments.98
A crucial characteristic of the ambassadors and safe conducts norms
95 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2760-61.
96 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 94, at *67-68.
97 See, e.g., Van Tu v. Koster, 364 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2004) (upholding
dismissal as untimely of an ATS suit by Vietnamese villagers against former American
soldiers for an alleged massacre during the Vietnam War);Jama v. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d
353, 365 (D.N.J. 1998) (holding that the ATS provides a cause of action against INS
officials and private contractors in an action by asylum seekers complaining of de-
grading conditions in a NewJersey detention center run by contractors).
98 See, e.g., Nat'l Coalition Gov't of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, 176 F.R.D. 329,
334-35 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
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was that they only applied to actions taken by private parties.99 The law
of nations in the eighteenth century recognized that governments
could violate international law, and some offenses could only be com-
mitted by governments. For an international offense to be recognized
at common law, the defendant had to be a private actor. As Black-
stone explained:
[W] here the individuals of any state violate this general law, it is the
interest as well as duty of the government under which they live, to
animadvert upon them with a becoming severity, that the peace of
the world may be maintained. For in vain would nations in their
collective capacity observe these universal rules, if private subjects
were at liberty to break them at their own discretion. 10 0
Thus these offenses do not support ATS recognition of causes of
action against official U.S. actors.
Nor do they support recognition of causes of action alleging
human rights abuses by U.S. corporations operating abroad. The
eighteenth century norms applied solely to foreigners enjoying the
protection of the forum state, either through the grant of safe-pas-
sage, or through recognition of diplomatic status. The admission of
such aliens created, in effect, a special duty of care in relation to
them. The necessity of common law enforcement of the ambassadors
and safe-conducts norms comes from the defendant being unreach-
able by the aggrieved foreign state, which would thus have to act
against England as a whole if it feels its nationals have been denied
justice. Similarly, injuries to foreign nationals committed by U.S. cor-
porations abroad can be remedied by the nations where those corpo-
rations operate. 10 1 Of course, it is unlikely that these nations will
choose to do so, because ATS plaintiffs usually allege that the corpo-
rate human rights abuses were done in partnership with the foreign
government. But this only underscores the dissimilarity between the
modern ATS litigation and the earlier common law offenses. There
can be no danger to U.S. relations with, say, Burma if Burmese nation-
als are not allowed to sue in U.S. courts for human rights offenses
99 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 94, at *73 (noting that the law of England only
punishes offenses against "universal law" that are "committed by private persons").
100 Id. at *68.
101 See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 477-80 (2d Cir. 2002) (upholding
dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds of an ATCA suit brought by Ecuadorian
citizens against an oil company alleging environmental harms from its Ecuadorian
operations and noting that such actions are best adjudicated in Ecuador). After Sosa,
the factors pertinent to forum non conveniens, a venue doctrine, become relevant to
the very existence of a cause of action under the ATS.
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allegedly committed by U.S. corporations with the complicity of the
Burmese government. 10
2
2. Piracy and UJ
Piracy provides the closest analog to the UJ offenses that have
made up the bulk of ATS litigation. According to Blackstone, while
offenses against ambassadors and bearers of safe-conducts would only
be punished by the nation where the offense occurred, "every commu-
nity hath a right ... to inflict ... punishment" upon pirates.10 3 Piracy
was the offense for which UJ was created, and for centuries it re-
mained the sole UJ offense.1 04  Proponents of expanding UJ to
human rights offenses claim piracy as a precedent and model.10 5 Jus-
tice Breyer's concurrence in Sosa focuses on the special relevance of
piracy to ATS litigation. He notes that there can be a consensus as to
the substantive content of an international norm, but this is distinct
from the further "procedural consensus" needed to make the norm
universally cognizable. 10 6
102 See Unocal, 176 F.R.D. at 336 (describing alleged human rights abuses con-
nected to the construction of a gas pipeline as ajoint venture between the defendant
corporation and the Burmese government).
103 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 94, at *71.
104 See Kontorovich, supra note 14, at 190; Michael P. Scharf, The ICC'sJurisdiction
over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 2001, at 67, 80-81 ("The first widely accepted crime of universal juris-
diction was piracy. For more than three centuries, states have exercised jurisdiction
over piratical acts on the high seas, even when neither the pirates nor their victims
were nationals of the prosecuting state.").
105 See Kontorovich, supra note 14, at 184-85 & nn.10-16, 203 & nn.117-18 (ex-
plaining the importance of the "piracy analogy" to modern UJ and citing cases and
commentary analogizing new universal offenses to piracy). As Judge Michael Kirby of
the Australian Supreme Court put it recently:
[T]here are precedents that would encourage a common-law judge to up-
hold universal jurisdiction. Courts of the common-law tradition have done
so in the past in relation to pirates .... Such people were.. . the perpetra-
tors.., of grave crimes against mankind. To this extent the notion of uni-
versal jurisdiction is not entirely novel or extralegal. What is new is the
expansion of crimes to which universal jurisdiction is said to apply.
Michael Kirby, Universal Jurisdiction and Judicial Reluctance: A New "Fourteen Points, " in
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES
240, 258 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004) [hereinafter UNIVERSALJURISDICTION]; see, e.g.,
Hari M. Osofsky, Note, Domesticating International Criminal Law: Bringing Human Rights
Violators to Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 191, 194 (1997) ("Piracy served as... the progenitor of
some of the later jurisdictional expansions.").
106 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2782-83 (2004) (Breyer, J., con-
curring).
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The bar for the latter consensus is much higher than for the for-
mer because of the dangers to international stability inherent in UJ. 10 7
Adjudicating purely foreign conduct can "threaten the ... harmony"
between nations, straining foreign relations and potentially leading to
hostilities.' 08 Thus UJ under the ATS is only appropriate when it
would be "consistent with principles of international comity." 109
Piracy's sole claim to UJ for hundreds of years suggests this will only
occur in a very limited range of circumstances. The Supreme Court
has already held that the First Congress did not grant federal courts
UJ even over criminal piracy prosecutions. 1 0 The First Congress's wa-
riness about UJ even over piracy suggests that any modern offense that
might receive universal cognizance must at least bear all the hallmarks
that made piracy both a substantive violation of the law of nations and
the only universally cognizable one.
II. PIRACY AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF UJ CRIMES
Despite the .importance of piracy as a precedent for modern
human rights offenses, the reasons why it was actionable under com-
mon law and universally cognizable have not been systematically ex-
plored. UJ can be dangerous: what made piracy safe for UJ?
Answering this question leads to an understanding of which modern
CIL offenses, if any, can be dealt with on a universal basis without
vexing foreign relations.
Most cases and commentary embrace the theory that piracy was
universally cognizable because of its extraordinary heinousness.' 1 1 In
107 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Kontorovich, supra note 14, at 184 (describ-
ing how UJ can have dangerous consequences).
108 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2783 (Breyer, J., concurring).
109 Id. (Breyer,J., concurring).
110 United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 632-33 (1818) (Marshall, C.J.)
(" [N] o general words of a statute ought to be construed to embrace them when com-
mitted by foreigners against a foreign government."). The Court has been even
firmer in refusing to interpret statutes as extending UJ to high seas offenses other
than piracy, precisely because of the foreign relations concerns pointed up in Sosa.
See United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820).
If by calling murder piracy, [Congress] might assert a jurisdiction over that
offence committed by a foreigner in a foreign vessel, what offence might not
be brought within their power by the same device? The most offensive inter-
ference with the governments of other nations might be defended on the
precedent.
Id. at 198.
111 See Kontorovich, supra note 14, at 205 ("The modern argument for universal
jurisdiction sees the historic treatment of piracy as evidence of an exception to stan-
dard jurisdictional limitations based on the 'outrageousness' or 'heinousness' of the
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this view, piracy demonstrates that international law has always ex-
tended UJ to what each era deems the most odious conduct.' 1 2 As it
happens, the current roster of UJ crimes-such as genocide, war
crimes, and torture-are expressly selected based on their intrinsic
heinousness. If piracy's unique status was also based on heinousness,
it would provide a venerable precedent for incorporating modern
human rights norms into the ATS. 1 13 However, the heinousness ex-
planation does not fit the historical facts, as has been shown in a previ-
ous article, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction's Hollow
Foundation.'14 The heinousness account begins with what many inter-
national lawyers believe should be the proper model of UJ-the moral
enormity of the offense. Defining UJ as based on heinousness, the
account then anachronistically shoehorns piracy UJ into that model.
The Piracy Analogy demonstrated that piracy's UJ status was not attribu-
table to the heinousness of the conduct; indeed, it was not even re-
garded as particularly heinous, at least not in the way that modem
crime."); id. at 185 n.10 (citing cases and commentary asserting that the substantive
heinousness of the conduct is the common rationale for UJ from piracy onwards);
Anthony Sammons, The "Under-Theorization" of Universal Jurisdiction: Implications for Le-
gitimacy on Trials of War Criminals by National Courts, 21 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 111, 127
(2003) ("Many commentators and jurists incorrectly.., assert that the basis of univer-
sal jurisdiction arises from the 'heinous' nature of the crime itself."); see also Christo-
pher C. Joyner, Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War
Criminals to Accountability, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 153, 165-67
(1996) (noting that "[p]iratical acts were made subject to universal jurisdiction ...
because they were considered particularly heinous and wicked acts of violence and
depredation" and arguing that this provides a precedent for UJ over war crimes);
Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REv. 785,
794 (1988) (arguing that the "rationale" for universal jurisdiction over piracy was that
the "fundamental nature" of the offense consisted of "particularly heinous and wicked
acts"); Scharf, supra note 104, at 80-81 ("Many of the crimes subject to the universal-
ity principle are so heinous in scope and degree that.., any state may, as humanity's
agent, punish the offender .... Piracy's fundamental nature and consequences ex-
plained why it was subject to universal jurisdiction. Piracy often consists of heinous acts
of violence or depredation.") (emphasis added); HenryJ. Steiner, Three Cheers for Universal
Jurisdiction-Or is it Only Two?, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 199, 223-24 (2004) (argu-
ing that the "analogy to piracy is persuasive" although piracy differs in some ways from
modern human rights offenses). But see REYDAMS, supra note 62, at 58 (criticizing the
piracy analogy).
112 See, e.g., Joyner, supra note 111, at 164-65 (explaining that the "universality
principle ... holds that some crimes are so universally abhorrent ... that jurisdiction
may be based solely on securing custody of the perpetrator"); Leila Nadya Sadat, Rede-
fining Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEw ENG. L. REv. 241, 244 (2001) (arguing that human
rights offenses are universally cognizable because they are "so heinous").
113 See Kontorovich, supra note 14, at 204-10.
114 Kontorovich, supra note 14.
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human rights offenses are.' 15  Sosa appears to agree, rejecting hei-
nousness as the common rationale of UJ and instead holding that the
determination of which offenses can be heard under the ATS requires
a close relation to the specific characteristics and policies underlying
piracy law, of which moral enormity is not one: "[A]lthough it is easy
to say that some policies of prolonged arbitrary detentions are so bad
that those who enforce them become enemies of the human race [the
phrase historically used to describe pirates], it may be harder to say
which policies cross that line with the certainty afforded by Black-
stone's three common law offenses."'1 16 This in effect rejects Filar-
tiga's famous formulation that any heinous international offense
makes the human rights offender sufficiently like a pirate-hostis
humani generis-to be sued on a universal basis under the ATS.11 7 But
if not heinousness, what then explains piracy's special status? This
Part, picking up where The Piracy Analogy left off, identifies the charac-
teristics of piracy that made it the sole universally cognizable
offense. 118
115 Only the basic outlines of the argument can be sketched here. First, the exact
same behavior engaged in by pirates was perfectly legal, and certainly not universally
cognizable, when committed with sovereign authorization-the letter of marque is-
sued to privateers. See id. at 210-14. Privateers were simply licensed pirates, yet all
maritime nations issued licenses authorizing the former to attack and plunder civilian
shipping and respected the licenses issued by other nations. Id. at 214-22. By con-
trast, heinousness as it is understood in today's CIL denotes conduct that is so horri-
ble that it could not be mitigated by sovereign authorization. Indeed the prototypical
modern UJ offenses of war crimes and genocide presuppose such authorization. Id.
at 217-18, 222-23. Second, The Piracy Analogy shows that piracy was a form of robbery
and understood to be not significantly more heinous than robbery in general. It was
regarded as culpable but not the most reprehensible crime. Id. at 223-26.
116 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2769 (2004) (emphasis added).
117 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[F]or purposes of
civil liability, the torturer has become-like the pirate ... before him-hostis humani
generis, an enemy of all mankind.").
118 Sosa noted, but did not elaborate on, the first two of these characteristics.
Some commentators have noted the importance of other features, such as piracy's
occurrence on the high seas and commission by private actors, in explaining the
crime's universal status. Other characteristics, such as the uniformity of punishment
meted out to pirates by various nations, have been entirely overlooked. Perhaps there
are other factors that could make an offense suitable to UJ, but these factors have yet
to be revealed by experience. In the meantime, Sosa's insistence that any new ATS
cause of action be "comparable" to the historical paragon requires keeping in view all
of the characteristics that contributed to piracy's unique status.
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A. Uniform Condemnation
Sosa specifically holds that universal condemnation must be a
characteristic of any ATS offense. 19 Certainly the broad international
condemnation of piracy was relevant to its unique legal status as a UJ
offense enforced by common law. There was no disagreement among
states about whether piratical conduct should be punished. There
can be no international consensus about making an offense univer-
sally cognizable if there is not even agreement about its wrongful-
ness.1 20 It is important to specify what "uniform condemnation"
means in this context. The universal condemnation of piracy was not
just embodied in the law of nations norm against it-piracy was also a
serious crime under the municipal laws of every nation. Thus the con-
demnation was not "top down," but "bottom up." However, uniform
condemnation was a necessary but insufficient condition for piracy to
become universally cognizable. Countless offenses were crimes in all
countries, from murder-to coining, but none became an offense
against the law of nations or universally cognizable. Thus while uni-
form condemnation is a useful starting point for determining whether
the ATS provides a right of action, for CIL norms, the inquiry cannot
stop there.
B. Narrowly-Defined Offense
Of the many characteristics of the eighteenth century norms that
provide limiting principles for modern ATS actions, the Supreme
Court placed special emphasis on their having a considerable degree
of "specificity."1 21 It is important to add that their content was not
only "definite" and "specific," but narrow as well: they applied to dis-
crete and easily-delimited types of conduct. Without international
agreement about the defining elements of an offense, it would be easy
for nations to exercise UJ opportunistically for political ends. 122 If the
119 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761.
120 See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 105 (2d Cir. 2003) ("The historical
restriction of universal jurisdiction to piracy, war crimes, and crimes against humanity
demonstrates that universal jurisdiction arises under customary international law only
where crimes .. .are universally condemned by the community of nations.").
121 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761.
122 See Yousef 327 F.3d at 106 (holding that terrorism is not subject to UJ because
"[u]nlike those offenses supporting universal jurisdiction under customary interna-
tional law-that is, piracy, war crimes, and crimes against humanity-that now have
fairly precise definitions . . . 'terrorism' is a term as loosely deployed as it is powerfully
charged") (emphasis added); see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,
795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (arguing that "the nations of the world
are so divisively split on the legitimacy of such [terrorist] aggression as to make it
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boundaries of an offense are unclear, it would be difficult to deter-
mine whether a borderline assertion of UJ is legitimate or a form of
what has become known as "lawfare."1 23 Furthermore, like any other
CIL norm, UJ requires the consent of all nations. The greater the
precision of an offense's definition, the easier it is to determine
whether nations have in fact consented to its universal cognizablity,
and the less reluctant they may be to grant such consent.
Piracy was defined as robbery on the high seas without state au-
thorization. 124 All nations concurred as to the definition, and it was
stable-its content did not vary in the least for hundreds of years. 125
In the seminal piracy case of United States v. Smith,126 Justice Story in-
quired "whether the crime of piracy is defined by the law of nations
with reasonable certainty."1 27 He quickly concluded that "[t]here is
scarcely a writer on the law of nations, who does not allude to piracy as
a crime of a settled and determinate nature ... all writers concur, in
holding, that robbery . . . upon the sea, animofurandi, is piracy."'128
impossible to pinpoint an area of harmony or consensus"); id. at 806-07 (Bork, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the acceptability of terrorism is a question as to which
there is "little or no consensus and in which the disagreements concern politically
sensitive issues") (emphasis added).
123 See Brigadier General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., It Ain't No TV Show: JAGS and
Modem Military Operations, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 479, 480 (2003) ("Lawfare is specifically
the strategy of using, or misusing, law as a substitute for traditional military means to
achieve an operational objective.").
124 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 94, at *72.
125 There have been recent attempts to change the definition, most notably the
recent Convention on the Law of the Sea. It defines piracy much more broadly, call-
ing it "any ... acts of violence or detention . . . committed for private ends." U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 101 (a), 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 435.
This would encompass not just robbery, but assault, rape, murder and so forth. But
this broad definition was entirely unknown in 1789. It bears noting that there appear
to be no instances of UJ under this broader definition of piracy. Indeed, the new,
broader definition demonstrates the necessity of narrowly defining an offense to
maintaining a consensus as to its universal congizability. Commentators have
powerfully criticized the Convention's definition, arguing that its indeterminacy has
robbed it of all practical usefulness. See ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 333 (2d
ed. 1998); Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, The Case of the Castle John, or Greenbeard the Pirate?:
Environmentalism, Piracy and the Development of International Law, 24 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1,
4 (1993).
126 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
127 Id. at 160.
128 Id. at 161.
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Tying the definition to the well-understood crime of robbery made it
particularly tractable; no new concepts were needed.
129
However, one commentator has recently argued that piracy
lacked an "authoritative definition," and thus "disagreement over the
scope or contours of a universal crime does not deprive the offense of
its universal character."'130 The alleged definitional uncertainty con-
cerns whether pirates had to operate from purely larcenous motives,
or animofurandi.131 It is true that animo furandi was discussed in some
piracy cases. Blackstone, however, does not mention any kind of mo-
tive as an element of the offense. Moreover, the suggestion that the
occasional discussions of animo furandi makes the offense vague mis-
apprehends the point of the concept in piracy law. It was never used
as a separate mens rea element of the offense, but rather as a test for
the existence of an undisputed element, namely, the absence of state
sponsorship. 132
Piracy had to be committed without sovereign authorization; oth-
erwise it would simply be legal privateering. Courts looked to animo
furandi as a proxy for sovereign authorization in situations like civil
wars and insurrections, where the identity or existence of the relevant
sovereign was debatable.1 3 3 There was never any suggestion, however,
129 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 94, at *72 (defining piracy as "those acts of rob-
bery and depredation upon the high seas, which, if committed upon land, would have
amounted to felony there") (emphasis added).
130 Scharf, supra note 104, at 81.
131 See id.; see also Randall, supra note 111, at 795 ("While universal jurisdiction
over piracy has existed for centuries, international law was slow to define the exact
meaning and scope of 'piracy.' Less than sixty years ago, scholars noted a 'great vari-
ety in opinions as to the scope of the term,' and concluded that 'there is no authori-
tative definition.'" (quoting Harvard Research in Int'l Law, Draft Convention and
Comment on Piracy, 26 AM.J. INT'L L. 739, 749-65 (Supp. 1932))).
132 See The Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232 (1844) (holding that the
"animo furandi' requirement simply refers to the basic element of piracy under the
"general law of nations" that the conduct be committed "without any sanction from
any public authority or sovereign power"); Menefee, supra note 125, at 4 (describing
"animo furandi" as an element that simply excludes privateers and others authorized
by "recognized powers"); Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, The New 'Jamaica Discipline".
Problems with Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 6
CONN. J. INT'L L. 127, 142-43 (1990).
133 See RUBIN, supra note 125, at 82; Menefee, supra note 125, at 4-5 (noting that
the principal focus of the animofurandi requirement was "the legitimacy of the power
granting the commission"). The Convention on the Law of the Sea does not require
pirates to have animo furandi or any other specific motive, and makes clear that the
real inquiry is into sovereign authorization. Under the Convention, the crime must
be committed by a "private ship" for "private ends," of which greed is only one. U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 125, at 435. A ship sailing under a writ
of marque authorizing it to attack other vessels would not be serving "private ends,"
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that sea robbers operating out of motives other than greed would be
beyond the reach of piracy law and UJ. 134 Nor does there appear to
be any piracy case where the defendant, though not in the service of
an established or putative state, was acquitted for lack of animo
furandi. The lack of substantial dispute over the existence of an animo
furandi requirement can also be inferred from the fact that many pi-
rates operated from political motives, or at least from some mix of
politics and profit.135
C. Uniform Punishment and Double Jeopardy
All nations provided for the same punishment for piracy-
death. 3 6 Differences in punishment across nations results in forum
shopping, weakened deterrence, and conflict betweens states that pre-
scribe different penalties. 137 For example, if Britain had some interest
in prosecuting pirates that attacked its ships, but the United States
seized them first, Britain would not have to worry that U.S. courts
would let them off easy-or punish them too severely.138 The prob-
lem of differential penalties is made acute by the international double
jeopardy norm, known by the civil law term "non bis in idem.'' 139 This
principle precludes subsequent prosecutions by other nations or
tribunals for a given universal offense as surely as double jeopardy
but a ship without a commission that attacks vessels for political purposes would still
be seeking "private ends," i.e., ends not established or endorsed by a sovereign state.
See Menefee, supra note 132, at 142-43.
134 The Supreme Court rejected the notion than an attack by a private vessel ap-
parently attributable to the captain's insanity would not be piracy for lack of animo
furandi: such conduct is piracy "whether they do it for purposes of plunder, or for
purposes of hatred, revenge, or wanton abuse of power." The Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2
How.) at 232.
135 See Kontorovich, supra note 14, at 217; Menefee, supra note 132, at 142-43.
136 See ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 131 (R. L. Meek et al. eds., Ox-
ford Univ. Press 1987) (1896).
137 See Steiner, supra note 111, at 220 ("[F]eatures of criminal prosecutions that
differ among states inevitably raise questions about the administration of universal
jurisdiction.... They may raise concerns about forum shopping to heighten the likeli-
hood of prosecution and conviction.").
138 See, e.g., Caroline D. Krass, Bringing the Perpetrators of Rape in the Balkans tojus-
tice: Time for an International Criminal Court, 22 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'V 317, 357-58
(1994) ("The United States is concerned that the court will develop an unacceptable
interpretation of crimes and that risk of double jeopardy problems will preclude na-
tional courts from prosecuting individuals acquitted by a politicized international
court." (citing Letter from Janet G. Mullins, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs,
Department of State, to the Hon. Dan Quayle, Pres. of the Senate 1 (Oct. 2, 1991))).
139 The term literally means "not twice for the same thing." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARv 1665 (7th ed. 1999).
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prohibits repeated prosecutions of the same conduct by a single
state.' 40 Thus the first nation to prosecute a UJ offense determines
the penalties. '
4 1
Crucially, non bis in idem is an exception to the standard interna-
tional practice regarding prior foreign prosecutions because it only
applies to universal crimes. Most nations adhere to some version of
the "the multiple sovereignties" principle. If a single act violates the
laws of multiple nations and each nation has jurisdiction over the of-
fender, each nation can prosecute in sequence. 42 Violating the law
of each sovereign is a separate offense. In U.S. law, such repeated
prosecutions do not violate the Fifth Amendment's bar against double
jeopardy.1 43 As the Supreme Court has observed, the multiple sover-
140 The Princeton Principles agree that a nation's "good faith" exercise of UJ
should be recognized as final and binding on all subsequent nations. See PRINCETON
PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURIS-
DICTION 23 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001), available at http://www.princeton.edu/
-lapa/unive-jur.pdf. However, several participants in the project "questioned
whether the prohibition on double jeopardy... was a recognized principle of interna-
tional law." Id. at 34.
141 A related concern is that the nation directly harmed by piracy would not be
satisfied with an acquittal by another nation exercising UJ, and would simply ignore
the international double jeopardy prohibition. This problem was articulated in the
surprisingly obscure case of United States v. Kessler, 26 F. Cas. 766 (C.C.D. Pa. 1829)
(No. 15,528). The judge urged the jury that the 1820 piracy statute should not be
read as creating UJ, because prosecuting cases unconnected to the United States
might put the defendant at risk of future double jeopardy:
Suppose this defendant, after a full and fair trial, should convince this jury of
his entire innocence and be by them acquitted. He would, on a fundamen-
tal principle of our criminal law, think himself out ofjeopardy and absolved
from all further responsibility on this account. Under this belief he goes to
France.... Would the courts of that country pay any regard to your judgment in
relation to a crime committed in one of their vessels on the person and property of their
subjects, and more especially if the offender also was one of their subjects? Questions
and difficulties of this sort are avoided by confining our cognizance of of-
fences on the high seas to our own ships, leaving other nations to take care
of their own.
Id. at 774 (emphasis added). After hearing these instructions, the jury returned an
acquittal. Id. at 775.
142 See Dax Eric Lopez, Note, Not Twice for the Same: How the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine
is Used to Circumvent Non Bis In Dem, 33 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1263, 1272-73 (2000)
(describing the variety of state practices with regard to international double jeopardy
and concluding that while some countries "afford foreign criminal judgments the
same legal effect they do to domestic criminal judgments" other states adhere to a
multiple sovereignties approach and there is no "general consensus among nations"
on the matter).
143 U.S. courts have consistently held that the United States can prosecute defend-
ants for conduct that has resulted in foreign convictions. Id. at 1279-81 (citing fed-
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eignties doctrine is most important when there is considerable varia-
tion between the penalties the different sovereigns provide for the
offense.144
The justification for the multiple sovereignties principle is inap-
plicable to UJ offenses, since UJ is itself not based on sovereignty.
Under UJ, states exercise a single shared jurisdiction. UJ treats "the
community of nations . .. as a juristic community."1 45 Each nation's
courts act as agents for the world.146 Thus a second nation prosecut-
ing the same offense would be as inappropriate as a U.S. district court
prosecuting a crime already adjudicated in another district. In United
States v. Furlong, Justice Johnson described the bar on multiple prose-
cutions as a defining feature of UJ over piracy:
Robbery on the seas is considered as an offence within the criminal
jurisdiction of all nations. It is against all, and punished by all; and
there can be no doubt that the plea of autrefois acquit would be
good in any civilized State, though resting on a prosecution insti-
tuted in the Courts of any other civilized State.147
Further confirmation of the view that nations prosecuting piracy
do not act as sovereigns asserting their several jurisdiction but rather
as agents of the international order can be found in a pair of nine-
teenth century British extradition cases-which also suggest the possi-
eral cases allowing for the prosecution of defendants previously convicted in foreign
nations). While several courts of appeals have consistently applied the multiple sover-
eignties principle to foreign prosecutions, the Supreme Court has only addressed the
issue in the federal-state context. Id. at 1279 n.118. The multiple sovereignties doc-
trine has frequent application within the United States, where the federal government
can prosecute a defendant based on the same conduct that has already resulted in
state charges, and vice versa, without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
144 Lanza, 260 U.S. at 385 (justifying the multiple sovereignties rule by pointing
out that if some states provide for less punishment than the federal government, "the
race of offenders to the courts of that state to plead guilty and secure immunity from
federal prosecution for such acts would not make for respect for the federal statute or
for its deterrent effect").
145 Quincy Wright, War Criminals, 39 AM. J. Irr'L L. 257, 282 (1945).
146 SeeJoyner, supra note 111, at 165 (arguing that the "only basis" for exercising
UJ is "the assumption that the prosecuting state is acting on behalf of all states");
Wright, supra note 145, at 280 (arguing that nineteenth century courts exercising UJ
over pirates acted as agents of the world community).
147 United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820). Justice Johnson's
statement in Furlong remains the leading authority for the principle, at least in the
United States. However, like most judicial pronouncements on UJ over piracy, this
one was dicta of the grossest sort. Furlong did not involve piracy; thus it did not pre-
sent the issue of UJ, let alone the implications of such jurisdiction for successive pros-
ecutions by different sovereigns.
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ble abuses that could result from UJ. In In re Tivnan, Britain arrested
American pirates but refused to extradite them. The relevant treaty
required rendering of defendants belonging to "each nation's juris-
diction." The British courts upheld the refusal to extradite. Since
piracy was a universal offense, the pirates were not particularly within
the jurisdiction of the United States. Britain argued that the treaty
meant only parochial U.S. jurisdiction and not "the jurisdiction which
the whole world shares with them."'148 Similarly, Attorney-General v.
Kwok-A-Sing 149 involved a Chinese pirate who attacked French ship-
ping in international waters and fled to Hong Kong. China requested
his extradition under a treaty that allowed rendition of those who had
committed "any crime or offence against the laws of China." The
Council held that "if he is punishable by the law of China, he is only so
punishable because he has committed an act of piracy which . . . is
justiciable everywhere" and the treaty did not contemplate extradition
in such circumstances. 150
D. Private Actors Who Reject Sovereign Protection
Pirates were private actors; their conduct did not involve govern-
mental action in any way. Blackstone specifically pointed out that
cases in which the common law "aid[ed] and enforce[d] the law of
nations" all involve offenses "committed by private persons."'151 The
eighteenth century law of nations recognized that some offenses (such
as violations of the laws of war) could only be committed by official
actors, and others could be committed by private actors. It only al-
lowed for UJ over the latter offenses. The drafters of the 1789 Act,
even if they could have contemplated it serving as a vehicle for new
offenses, must have understood it as confined to torts by "private
persons.
The lack of state sponsorship was essential to the definition of
piracy. From the seventeenth through early nineteenth centuries, all
maritime states issued licenses, called letters of marque and reprisal,
to merchant ships known as privateers. A letter of marque authorized
its bearer to attack and seize civilian ships on the high seas-essen-
148 In re Tivnan, 122 Eng. Rep. 971, 985 (Q.B. 1864) (Crompton, J.) ("Is this a
piracy within the words of the statute? It is to be within the jurisdiction of the United
States; but does that mean within the jurisdiction which the whole world shares with
them?"), quoted in In re Stupp, 23 F. Cas. 281, 291 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 13,562).
149 5 L.R.- P.C. 179 (1873).
150 Id. at 200 (emphasis added).
151 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 94, at *73.
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tially the same conduct that constituted piracy. 152 Yet the privateer
was not only free from UJ, he was not guilty of any crime. 153 The only
difference between a lawful privateer and an outlaw pirate was the
latter's lack of sovereign authorization. 154 Thus someone who com-
mitted the actions constituting piracy but did so with sovereign au-
thorization would not violate the law of nations.
The limitation of the law of nations norm against piracy to those
commerce-raiders who acted purely on private initiative served two in-
terrelated ends. First, it reduced the chances that prosecution would
cause interstate hostilities. Indicting a foreign official can be per-
ceived as a grave insult by his government, and an interference with
his nation's sovereignty. 15 5 Second, official conduct is political con-
duct. Keeping this outside the scope of international law reduces the
opportunities for it to become a political tool, and keeps judges fo-
cused on their traditional task of righting wrongs on a retail basis
rather than ruling on broad questions of foreign policy. 156 Modern
human rights offenses, on the other hand (such as war crimes and
152 See ANGUS KONSTAM, PRIVATEERS & PIRATES 1730-1830, at 3 (2001) (describing
privateering as "a form of nationally sponsored piracy"); MarkJ. Osiel, Obeying Orders:
Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law Of War, 86 CAL. L. REV. 939, 1127 n.772 (1998)
("Acts of piracy often appear on their face exactly the same as acts-lawful even into
this century-of maritime privateering.").
153 See DAVID CORDINGLY, UNDER THE BLACK FLAG, at xvii-xviii (1995).
154 See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 94, at *251 ("[T]he lord chancellor shall make
him out letters of marque under the great seal; and by virtue of these he may attack
and seise the property... without hazard of being condemned a robber or a pirate.");
John C. Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral Future, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1673,
1690 n.67 (2000) ("Without a letter, such actions would constitute piracy; with one,
military actions became a legitimate form of privateering under international law.").
155 For example, the Spanish indictment and request for extradition of General
Augusto Pinochet, a senator and former dictator of Chile, strained relations between
Santiago and Madrid and London, which faced a Spanish extradition request. See
Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, 1 A.C. 61 (H.L. 2000) (Lloyd, L.).
On 3 November 1998 the Chilean Senate adopted a formal protest against
the manner in which the Spanish courts had violated the sovereignty of
Chile by asserting extra-territorial jurisdiction. They resolved also to protest
that the British Government had disregarded Senator Pinochet's immunity
from jurisdiction as a former head of state.
Id. at 89.
156 The limitation of UJ to private actors does not entirely purge the question of
political considerations because private parties can act with political ends. During
civil wars, insurrections, and secessions, the question of whether someone is a private
actor can require, or at least imply, judgments about political legitimacy. See
Kontorovich, supra note 14, at 222.
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genocide) invariably involve state action.15 7 As a result, some scholars
have argued that piracy does not provide a precedent for modern UJ
over state actors.
58
Yet merely characterizing pirates as private actors does not go far
enough in explaining piracy's unique status in the law of nations. A
state is likely to have some interest in the fate of all of its nationals, not
just its officials. So while it is true that asserting UJ over governmental
actors would be more objectionable than over private ones, it is not
clear why UJ over private parties would not be at least somewhat objec-
tionable to the defendant's home state. Consider, for example, the
solicitude of Britain, France, Australia and other Western nations for
their nationals captured in Afghanistan by the United States. Indeed,
states show concern about such things as the non-extension of consu-
lar rights to their nationals charged with crimes abroad, even when
prosecuted by the nations where the offense was committed. It would
be even more obnoxious if the prosecuting state has not even been
injured by the defendant; exercising jurisdiction in such a case could
be seen as officious intermeddling, or as an overtly political act. 159
On closer examination, pirates achieved their unique status be-
cause they were not simply private parties. Rather, they were private
parties who often acted against the interest of their home state and who
had intentionally waived their home state's protection.160 Blackstone em-
157 See BROWNLIE, supra note 59, at 236 ("The essential feature of the definition [of
piracy] is that the acts must be committed for private ends.").
158 See Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimacy of Interna-
tional Human Rights Litigation, 66 FoR-HAM L. REV. 319, 362 n.230 (1997) (observing
that nineteenth century piracy jurisdiction "cannot be invoked as a basis to construe
the original understanding of the [Alien Tort Statute] to extend to the acts of a for-
eign sovereign and its agents committed on foreign soil in violation" of international
law); Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr., The Limits of Legitimacy: The Rome Statute's
Unlawful Application to Non-State Parties, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 63, 75 & n.25 (2004)
("[T]here was no state responsibility implicated by pirate offenses.").
159 See Steiner, supra note 111, at 223.
In comparison with piracy, the contemporary use of universal jurisdiction
weakens the criticism that the forum is simply advancing its own interests.
Such interests are now undifferentiated from the community or global inter-
est in curbing massive and grievous violations, whereas the powerful seafar-
ing nations could literally refer to their concrete and differentiated interests
in both punishing the defendant and deterring similar conduct.
Id.
160 This understanding of UJ was adopted by Hannah Arendt, who initially sup-
ported the UJ prosecution of Eichmann by analogizing his crimes to piracy. She later
concluded that the piracy analogy only supports UJ over those who renounced any
sovereign protection. The pirate fell under UJ because "he has chosen to put himself
outside all organized communities" and he "acknowledged obedience to no flag what-
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phasized this when discussing why the common law allows for univer-
sal punishment only of pirates. The pirate, according to Blackstone,
has intentionally "renounced all the benefits of society and govern-
ment."'16 1 The "benefits" that the pirate has renounced are the pro-
tection and solicitude of his home state. While the home state might
object to a UJ prosecution of a non-piratical criminal, it would not do
so for those who knowingly waived such protection. As Justice Story
put it, in words that clearly hearken back to Blackstone's discussion,
pirates were "not under the acknowledged authority, or derivingprotec-
tion from the flag or commission of any government. ' 162 Blackstone's
conception envisions three classes of international law offenders: offi-
cial actors, private actors, and those who have gone outside the pri-
vate/public dichotomy to the "savage state of nature."'163 The
common law only acted against those in the second and third classes,
and did so on a UJ basis only for those in the third class (pirates).
To understand why pirates were a particularly unprotected class of
private actors, one must recall that piracy existed side-by-side with pri-
vateering. The sole difference was that the privateer had a license to
capture and despoil ships, while the pirate did not. Obtaining a writ
of marque was notoriously easy; one did not have to demonstrate nau-
tical prowess or moral probity.164 The writ of marque offered two ad-
vantages to the issuing state. First, the writ limited the bearer to
preying on ships of hostile nations. States that issued writs of marque
wanted to direct commerce-raiding to where they regarded it most
useful to them. At the same time, they did not want their nationals to
embroil them in disputes and potential hostilities with neutral nations
(the same consideration that informs the common law enforcement
of the norms regarding ambassadors and safe passages). Second, let-
ters of marque usually required privateers to split the proceeds of
their captures with the licensing power. 165 Pirates were those com-
soever." HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM 262 (rev. ed. 1965). This led her
to the conclusion that Israel could only prosecute him for crimes againstJews, not for
crimes against humanity. Id. at 269. For a summary of Arendt's views, see David
Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 85, 124 n.140 (2004).
161 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 94, at *71.
162 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 163 (1820) (emphasis added).
Yet in another purported UJ case, the objections of the ship's home state to U.S.
jurisdiction led Justice Story to yield to the foreign relations imperatives and refuse to
exercise jurisdiction. United States v. LaJeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 851 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551).
163 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 94, at *71.
164 See Kontorovich, supra note 14, at 211-12 (describing procedures for securing
a writ of marque).
165 See id. at 214.
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merce raiders who refused to share their earnings with any govern-
ment. They sometimes competed for prizes with licensed privateers,
thus reducing potential revenues for the licensing state. Pirates acted
against the interests of their home state and so could expect no suc-
cor from it.
These considerations explain the legal fiction of statelessness fa-
mously articulated by Blackstone 166 and subsequently by Chief Justice
Marshall in United States v. Klintock.167 In United States v. Palmer,168
decided two years before Klintock, Marshall had held that the federal
piracy statute, 169 which criminalized piracy committed by "any per-
son," did not apply to crimes by foreigners against foreigners.170 Mar-
shall recognized that such UJ could result in judicial interference with
other nations' sovereign prerogatives. 171 In Klintock, Marshall ap-
pended an odd qualification to Palmer the statute does cover piracies
by those who are not nationals of any state. 172 The Certificate upheld
the indictment because the defendants had "throw[n] off their na-
tional character by cruising piratically."'173
Marshall's entire discussion of statelessness may have been unnec-
essary because, as the Attorney General stressed, Klintock was a citi-
166 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 94, at *71 (explaining that pirates were universally
punishable because they "renounced all the benefits of society and government").
167 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144 (1820).
168 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818).
169 Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 114.
170 See Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 633-34. Marshall wrote:
The court is of opinion that the crime of robbery, committed by a person on
the high seas, on board of any ship or vessel belonging exclusively to subjects
of a foreign state, on persons within a vessel belonging exclusively to subjects
of a foreign state, is not a piracy within the true intent and meaning of the
act ....
Id. Quite unnecessarily, Marshall opined in unsupported dicta that Congress could
have chosen to punish foreigners for piracies against foreigners under the UJ princi-
ple. Id. at 630 ("[T]here can be no doubt of the right of the legislature to enact laws
punishing pirates, although they may be foreigners, and may have committed no par-
ticular offence against the United States."). However, he interpreted the statute on
the assumption that Congress had not intended to authorize UJ. Id.
171 Id. at 632-33.
172 Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 152. Speaking for the Court, Marshall opined:
We think that the general words of the act of Congress applying to all per-
sons whatsoever, though they ought not to be so construed as to extend to
persons under the acknowledged authority of a foreign State, ought to be so
construed as to comprehend those who acknowledge the authority of no
State.
Id.
173 Id. at 153.
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zen of the United States; 1 74 no special jurisdictional theory was
needed. It is not clear why Marshall did not simply look to Klintock's
citizenship. It may be because in the previous case, Palmer, he sup-
ported his holding that Congress had not intend to create UJ by citing
the statute's title-"an act for the punishment of certain crimes
against the United States."175 Klintock had seized a Danish vessel,' 76 and
if the title of the act had the legal effect Marshall suggested in Palmer,
it might also be thought to exclude crimes by Americans against for-
eigners. So to sustain jurisdiction over a crime committed by a U.S.
national, the ChiefJustice shoe-horned the case into the universal the-
ory by arguing that the defendant was stateless, and that the statute
allowed jurisdiction over stateless people. The statelessness notion is
obviously a fiction, though one that continues to confuse discussions
of UJ over piracy.1 7 7 There is nothing magical about piracy that de-
stroys its perpetrators' national connection. Modern piracy law is
more positivist, recognizing that whether a pirate throws off his na-
tional character is a matter for his home state to decide.1 7 8 This is
consistent with the facts of Klintock, where the high court of the home
state, the United States, deemed him stateless, though it could have
reached the same result by treating him as an American national.
Marshall's holding that UJ could only extend to those who "ac-
knowledge the authority of no State"'1 79 is simply a shorthand for the
idea that UJ only applies when it will not lead to interstate conflict
174 Id. at 144.
175 Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 631 (emphasis added).
176 Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 145.
177 See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 104 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that
"[s] rates and legal scholars have acknowledged for at least 500 years" that piracy is a
universal offense in part "because the crime occurs statelessly on the high seas").
178 See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 125, at 437 ("A ship or
aircraft may retain its nationality although it has become a pirate ship or aircraft. The
retention or loss of nationality is determined by the law of the state from which such
nationality was derived."). Current U.S. law allows for the prosecution of "stateless"
drug smugglers seized on the high seas (however, unlike in Chief Justice Marshall's
view, the mere act of engaging in the prohibited activity does not make the vessels
stateless). The "statelessness" of the current U.S. statute is also a patent fiction-a
ship can be treated as stateless despite being registered by a foreign state, so long as
that state explicitly or implicitly disavows a connection with the vessel. See Maritime
Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) § 3, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(c) (2) (A)-(C)
(2000) (defining "vessel without nationality" as being one whose claim of registry is
"denied by the flag nation whose registry is claimed" or simply not "affirmatively and
unequivocally" confirmed by the registering ship when queried by U.S. officials).
Thus the MDLEA's statelessness inquiry, like Chief Justice Marshall's, focuses on
whether the foreign state is prepared to stand up for the defendant.
179 Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 152.
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because other nations will not stand up for the defendants. Pirates
rejected their home states' licensing schemes, thus refusing their
home states' protection. Prosecutions of such offenders would be un-
likely to cause friction with a foreign state-unlike prosecutions of a
foreign state's officials, its nationals acting under color of its law, or its
nationals acting in violation of its laws but otherwise within its legal
framework.
E. Locus Delecti Makes Enforcement Difficult
Piracy's occurrence on the high seas was certainly relevant to its
universal status, yet its significance is widely misunderstood. The same
conduct occurring on land would be robbery and not subject to UJ.
Yet the high seas locus was in itself insufficient for UJ: murder or any
other offense was not universally cognizable even when committed on
the high seas.' 0 It is sometimes said that because no state has juris-
diction over international waters, traditional notions of jurisdiction
simply did not apply and UJ was needed to fill in a jurisdictional lacu-
nae. 18 The flaw in this explanation is that pirates' crimes did not take
place in the water on the high seas-they were committed onboard
ships. Maritime vessels have always been considered within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of their flag state, 182 and a victim ship's home state
clearly had jurisdiction over pirates that attacked it. Moreover, both
the pirates and their victims came from somewhere; thus the crime
could have been within the jurisdiction of their home states. In short,
traditional jurisdictional concepts appear adequate to deal with piracy
without recourse to universality.183
180 See United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197-99 (1820).
181 See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2775 (2004) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in relevant part) (suggesting that the law of nations
norm against piracy arose because they were "beyond all ... territorial jurisdictions");
Lee A. Casey, The Case Against the International Criminal Court, 25 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J.
840, 855 (2002) ("[T]he only universal offenses that have a long history of general
acceptance are piracy and the slave trade, both activities taking place on the high seas,
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any single State."); Bork, supra note 57 (writing
that piracy was regarded as a violation of international law giving rise to UJ "because
the offense took place on the high seas beyond the reach of any nation's laws").
182 See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 4, 18-19 (Sept. 7);
OLIVER SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 250-52 (1991).
183 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The History of Universal Jurisdiction, in UNIVERSALJURIS-
DICTION, supra note 105, at 40, 47 (explaining that "early modern thinking about
piracy was not ... linked to universal jurisdiction" but rather to views such as Grotius's
that "ships on the high seas were an extension of the flag state's territoriality" and
thus the flag state-and the flag state only-should be able to punish non-nationals
for piracy against national ships).
200o4 ]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
The real problem was not the formal jurisdictional status of the
high seas but the practical problem of enforcement.18 4 There was al-
most no governmental control over the seas and no "on the spot" en-
forcement system, as there would be for crimes within the body of a
nation. 85 The high cost of maintaining a navy, and the need to em-
ploy it against foreign fleets, made piracy perhaps the most expensive
of crimes to police. Because of the vastness of seas, pirates could eas-
ily commit their crimes undetected.1 8 6 The many largely uninhabited
islands of the Caribbean, replete with unmapped coves and harbors,
afforded perfect hideouts for pirates in between cruises. These diffi-
culties were stressed by Adam Smith in explaining why piracy, unlike
simple robbery, was a capital offense.' 87
F. Directly Threatens or Harms Many Nations
Piracy imperiled international commerce and navigation, which
many and perhaps all states had an interest in protecting. 88 While
184 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Defining the Limits: Universal Jurisdiction and National
Courts, in UNrVERSALJURISDICTION, supra note 105, at 168, 168-69 ("The principle of
universality... is the way in which international law has responded to the pragmatic
difficulties ... of prosecuting offenses recognized as illegal in domestic legal systems
around the world.").
185 Willard B. Cowles, Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes, 33 CAL. L. REV.
177, 193-94 (1945).
186 See Scharf, supra note 104, at 81 ("[P]irates can quickly flee across the seas,
making pursuit by the authorities of particular victim states difficult."); Osofsky, supra
note 105, at 194 n.18 ("If the nation owning the ship were the only one that could
assume jurisdiction, pirates could easily escape capture and prosecution by boarding
ships far from their home ports and keeping them beyond the reach of the home
navies.").
187 See SMITH, supra note 136, at 131 (observing that piracy "requires a severe pun-
ishment" because of the "great opportunities there are of committing it"). Just as
traditional jurisdictional rules were not useless in the face of piracy, the enforcement
difficulties should not be overstated. The high seas are vast, but merchant ships gen-
erally traveled in known sea-lanes defined by wind and tide and commercial opportu-
nity, and pirates would be found there too. See CORDINGLY, supra note 153, at 88-89.
Nations could and did police against pirates that threatened their commerce. During
outbreaks of piracy they would sometimes dispatch vessels with specific instructions to
hunt down the offenders. SeeViolet Barbour, Privateers and Pirates of the West Indies, 16
Am. HIST. REX,. 529 (1911).
188 See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 104 (2d Cir. 2003) (observing that
piracy has long been subject to UJ in part "because of the threat that piracy poses to
orderly transport and commerce between nations"); Harvard Research in Int'l Law,
Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 739 (Supp. 1935) (suggesting
that piracy was universally cognizable because "all [states] have an interest in the
safety of commerce"); Randall, supra note 111, at 795 (noting that since "intercourse
among states occurred primarily by way of the high seas," and because piracy was
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some pirates focused their attacks on the shipping of particular na-
tions out of geographic convenience or personal and political
grudges, most pirates were ready to attack any targets of opportunity,
regardless of what flag they flew. Pirates were famously denounced as
"hostis humani generis," and this term has come to be nearly synony-
mous with UJ itself.'89 Indeed, had pirates been content to limit their
depredations, they could have legally done so within the confines of a
letter of marque; rejecting the licensing process indicates an unwill-
ingness to abide by its limitations, salient among them the limitation
of hostilities to the ships of specified nations.
Blackstone saw the direct danger pirates posed to "person or per-
sonal property" of all mankind as the primary reason for its direct
punishment under common law and its status as the only UJ of-
fense. 190 Thus in the eighteenth century view, piracy was punishable
by all nations not because of the moral enormity of the offense, but
simply because it posed an actual threat to most or all nations-Black-
stone describes the international law norm against piracy as in effect
authorizing national "self-defence."'191 Thus even piracy's status as an
offense against both common law and the law of nations provides little
basis for true UJ, that is, jurisdiction over conduct that does not
threaten the forum state to the extent that prosecution can be reason-
ably described as "self-defense."
G. Summary
Six characteristics of piracy and piracy law contributed to its
unique status as a UJ offense in both international and common law.
indiscriminate in its targets, it was a matter of "concern to all states"); Sammons, supra
note 111, at 126 ("[P]irates launched attacks . . .against the vessels and citizens of
many nations .... The transnational aspect of piracy is the most significant factor in
justifying the exercise of universal jurisdiction over it.").
189 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 94, at *71 (citing Sir Edward Coke's description
of pirates); Randall, supra note 111, at 794. However, modern courts and commenta-
tors have misunderstood the significance of the "hostis humani generis" characteriza-
tion. The term has sometimes been regarded as one of opprobrium-pirates are so
bad that they are everyone's enemy. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890
(2d Cir. 1980) (" [F]or purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become-like the
pirate... before him- hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind."). This under-
standing of hostis humani generis proceeds from the assumption that piracy was, like
modern UJ offenses, universally cognizable because of its heinousness, and finds in
that epithet evidence that piracy was regarded as particularly heinous. The deficien-
cies of this account have been described in a previous article. See Kontorovich, supra
note 14, at 204-37.
190 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 94, at *71.
191 Id.
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Because of these features, a nation's assertion of UJ over the offense
would be unlikely to disturb its foreign relations. First, all nations
criminalized the conduct in their own municipal codes. This how-
ever, was a very minimal requirement. Because the crime was nar-
rowly and specifically defined, there would be fewer disputes between
nations about whether particular conduct fell within the UJ norm.
And because all nations provided for the same punishment, it made
relatively little difference which nation prosecuted. Perhaps most im-
portantly, because pirates were private actors, their offenses did not
implicate the conduct or policy of any sovereign state. Moreover, be-
cause pirates rejected the protection offered by sovereign states in the
form of letters of marque, it would be relatively unlikely that any state
would object to their prosecution, regardless of the forum.
Piracy occurred on the high seas, the vastness of which made it
difficult for any one nation to provide effective enforcement. Moreo-
ver, the indiscriminate nature of piratical attacks made it at least
somewhat probable that a given pirate had or would threaten the ves-
sels of many nations; and the threat the conduct posed to interna-
tional commerce, which was primarily borne by sea, directly
implicated the economic interest of all states. The interests involved
were not abstract and inchoate, like a general interest in maintaining
international law, but rather real and material. One might think that
far from vexing other states, one nation's use of UJ to punish pirates
would please the others. The prosecuting nation would, entirely at its
own expense, deal with a problem common to many nations. If pi-
rates may be likened to weeds in a global commons, a nation that
single-handedly undertakes to pull out the weeds would not have to
worry that it was creating foreign relations problems for itself.
At this point a paradox emerges.1 92 Given that piracy's occur-
rence on the high seas made enforcement particularly costly, why
would UJ-which merely allows nations to punish those who had not
directly injured them-make the problem any more tractable? Simi-
larly, if piracy harmed many nations, why would any one state have an
incentive to exercise UJ over them? States do not have an interest in
the safety of commerce and navigation in general; they have an inter-
est in the safety of their own commerce and navigation. By prosecuting
pirates on a universal basis, nations would be conferring a benefit on
many states while single-handedly shouldering all the costs, hardly the
kind of action one would expect of rational, self-interested states. In-
192 I explore this puzzle in more detail in a forthcoming article. Eugene
Kontorovich, The Evidentiary Role of Universal Jurisdiction (work in progress, on file
with the author).
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deed, the leading scholar on piracy law has shown UJ prosecutions
were almost nonexistent. 193 Because enforcement was expensive, it
was almost always done for parochial rather than universal ends.
The same paradox has been observed in relation to today's UJ
over human rights offenses. The extension of the universal principle
to war crimes and genocide is motivated at least partly by the difficulty
of preventing such conduct.' 9 4 But precisely because stopping such
atrocities is expensive and risky, UJ has done next to nothing to en-
courage nations unharmed by such offenses to take action against
them. 195 In short, some of the factors that made piracy safe for UJ
also tended to ensure that such jurisdiction would be exercised rarely,
if at all. Thus one should not consider it an anomalous result if Sosa's
requirement that modern CIL norms posses those features that made
UJ over piracy unproblematic in practice precludes federal courts
from exercising UJ.
III. MODERN CIL UNDER SOSA'S HISTORIcAL TEST
Sosa concluded that the "standard" a new CIL norm must meet to
be actionable under the ATS can be derived by "look[ing] to the his-
torical antecedents" for such actions.196 This Article has done just
that. Part I.D.1 showed that with the exception of piracy, the histori-
cal antecedents were purposefully confined to offenses committed by
private nationals of the forum country against specially protected clas-
193 See RUBIN, supra note 125, at 302, 317 n.13, 326 n.50 (finding approximately
five UJ prosecutions of pirates in the past 300 years); see also Kontorovich, supra note
14, at 192 n.51 (suggesting that paucity of UJ piracy cases may be partially attributable
to the use of military power and summary proceedings at sea as primary means of
enforcement, as well as to sporadic court reporting).
194 See Cowles, supra note 185, at 194 (observing that "war crimes are very similar
to piratical acts" in that there is no on-the-spot judicial system to punish it, and argu-
ing that war crimes should thus also be universally cognizable).
195 SeeJack L. Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI.
L. REv. 89, 93 (2003) (observing that international war crimes tribunals have little
effect). Goldsmith explains:
Nations do not lightly expend national blood and treasure to stop human
rights abuses in other nations. The Europeans were unwilling and unable to
do so in the Balkans for years .... The brute fact is that despite hundreds of
thousands of deaths caused by human rights abuses during the past dec-
ade ... no wellspring of support for intervention has developed in the indus-
trialized democracies that posses the military muscle to intervene and stop
the abuses.
Id; see Luban, supra note 160, at 152 & n.274 (noting that "in reality states have
proven unwilling to touch these [UJ] cases with a ten-foot pole," and citing the failure
of the United States to get nations to assert UJ over Pol Pot as an example).
196 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2765 (2004).
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ses of foreigners. This standard would preclude both ATS suits against
official U.S. actors and against U.S. corporations acting in conjunction
with foreign governments abroad. However, the largest and most con-
troversial portion of ATS litigation thus far has involved suits by for-
eigners against foreigners for human rights abuses abroad.
Piracy is the only possible historical antecedent of such suits, as
Justice Breyer emphasizes, 197 and thus its characteristics must be ex-
amined particularly closely to derive the limiting principles contem-
plated by Sosa. It is in such suits that the Court urges the greatest
caution. 198 Thus courts in ATS cases should be particularly vigilant
that any modern CIL norm they wish to recognize possesses those fea-
tures that made UJ over piracy consistent with maintaining smooth
foreign relations. Having isolated and explained those characteristics
in Part II, this Part briefly considers whether they are shared by new
CIL norms, which are primarily concerned with human rights of-
fenses. It finds that modern CIL offenses do not meet these rigorous
criteria.
The comparison can start with the two criteria identified in Sosa,
universal condemnation of narrowly defined offenses. It is a banality
that war crimes, genocide, torture, and similar crimes are broadly con-
demned. But this broad condemnation means little unless everyone
understands these terms the same way; in other words, unless there is
uniform agreemerit as to the specific conduct that falls within these
offenses and what conduct does not. It is here that CIL diverges from
piracy. For piracy had a narrow and precise definition. In contrast,
the definitions of the human rights offenses nominated for UJ are
broad and indeterminate, as even supporters of an expanded UJ con-
cede. 199 This raises the possibility that the availability of UJ over such
conduct would hinge on the political or moral inclinations of the
197 Id. at 2782-83 (Breyer, J., concurring).
198 Id. at 2761-62.
199 See Kirby, supra note 105, at 250 (suggesting that judges should be cautious
about accepting UJ because "the crimes propounded may be ill-defined"); Leila
Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy
Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 426-27 (2000) ("Defining crimes against humanity
presented one of the most difficult challenges at Rome, for no accepted definition
existed, either as a matter of treaty or customary international law. Indeed, of the
several definitions that have been 'promulgated,' no two are alike.") (footnote omit-
ted); see also Eugene Kontorovich, Severe and Prolonged Harm: Defining Torture in Inter-
national and U.S. Law, WASH. TIMES, June 25, 2004, at A21 (" 'Torture' is not defined
with any precision in international or U.S. law. There is no authoritative enumeration
of the practices that constitute torture."); E.V. Kontorovich, Open and Shut, JERUSALEM
POST, May 10, 2002, at B8 (arguing that the Rome Statute creates "vague offenses,"
such as "persecution," which is unhelpfully defined as violating "fundamental rights,"
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prosecutors and judges; the vagueness of these offenses would at a
minimum give judges great discretion in matters pertaining to foreign
relations, a discretion traditionally reserved to the political branches.
Even before Sosa, there were signs that courts were becoming in-
creasingly sensitive to the importance of UJ offenses being precisely
defined. The Second Circuit, which originated modern ATS litiga-
tion, recently rejected the contention that UJ applies to international
terrorism on the grounds that "terrorism" lacks a precise or neutral
definition.200 There can be no doubt that as a positive matter, the
mantra that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" is
accurate. 20 1 To be sure, there are sound, narrow definitions of terror-
ism, such as violence committed by irregular combatants against civil-
ian populations to change the policy of a government. The Second
Circuit's point was not that "terrorism" is a term that cannot be nar-
rowly defined in the abstract, but rather that no precise definition has
won general acceptance. 20 2
Of course, definitional precision is a matter of degree. There will
always be gray areas in the definition of any crime.20 All that is ar-
gued here is that what was contemplated by piracy was much better
understood than what is contemplated by modern human rights of-
fenses such as crimes against humanity and war crimes. At the very
least the latter offenses cover more varied types of conduct and thus
have a broader surface area over which disagreement and friction can
arise. The Supreme Court appears to recognize this in Sosa, by requir-
ing not merely some degree of definitional precision, but rather insist-
another indefinite term given the profound international "disagreement over what
rights are 'fundamental"').
200 United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 109 (2d Cir. 2003).
201 Id. at 107.
202 See Colum Lynch, U.N. Approves Anti-Terrorism Initiative, WASH. POST, Oct. 9,
2004, at A26 (reporting that the U.N. terrorism resolution was reached after a com-
promise was made with several Muslim nations under which the resolution does not
provide "a universal definition of terrorism that could be used to sanction groups that
use suicide bombers against civilian targets").
203 Reciprocity and balance of power issues also affect whether the definition of a
crime will be loosely or opportunistically interpreted. Just as some people say that
one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter, nations often denounced other
states' privateers as mere pirates. Yet they did not generally punish them as pirates
out of fear that their own privateers would receive the same treatment. It is hard to
see such reciprocity playing out with the new UJ offenses, where the forum state is
always economically and militarily superior to the defendant's home state and risks
little in direct retaliation.
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ing on a high level of definitional certainty, a level that was found
lacking in the cross-border abduction norm. 20 4
Looking beyond the definitional criteria, CIL norms run into a
further and larger obstacle. Most ATS litigation since Filartiga would
fail the Sosa test because it challenges official or semi-official action.
The common law only punished offenses committed by private actors
in England. When it came to punishing conduct by foreigners, the
common law only did so in the case of piracy. That offense was com-
mitted not simply by private actors, but by ones who turned their
backs on their home states and thus would not be expected to receive
any protection from them. Modern UJ offenses, on the other hand,
are almost invariably committed under color of law. Indeed, the na-
ture of such offenses as genocide and war crimes contemplates official
action. Not surprisingly, most ATS suits have been against the leaders
or military officers of foreign governments. Quite unlike pirates,
these are people for whom their home state would be expected to
have some solicitude. Indeed, the home states of some ATS defend-
ants have challenged American assertions of UJ. 20 5
Furthermore, the very definition of piracy entailed rejecting the
protection of sovereign states by acting outside their licensing
schemes. Thus ATS litigation against private corporations also does
not bear the vital characteristics of piracy. Firms like Unocal, Royal
Dutch Shell, and so forth are private actors, but they have not
foresworn the protection of their home states. To the contrary, they
are chartered by or incorporated under the laws of sovereign nations
(and they pay taxes). Their treatment in American courts would not
be a matter of indifference to these authorities. Moreover, suits
against such corporations generally allege coordination with a foreign
state, and thus the defendant corporations resemble licensed (and le-
gal) privateers more than pirates acting beyond any sovereign
authority.
Other relevant characteristics of piracy are also absent from mod-
ern human rights offenses. Pirates attacked the ships of many nations.
By disrupting international commerce, they injured the economic in-
terests of many more. As a result, a UJ prosecution would be unlikely
to offend other states, for they would benefit from it. But it also sug-
gests that UJ over pirates was less "universal" than it sounds, in that
the forum state took action against those who posed a threat to it.
This explains why UJ may be in the self-interest of the forum state and
204 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2767 (2004).
205 See, e.g., Edward Wong, China Protests U.S. Rights Suit Against a Leader, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 3, 2000, at A4.
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why the common law authorized punishing pirates as a form of self-
defense. This gave the forum state a motive for prosecuting pirates,
and the existence of an identifiable self-defense interest would reduce
the chances that a UJ judgment would seem politically motivated, de-
signed to send a message of disapproval about the actions of foreign
governments.
Human rights offenses, on the other hand, are almost always
committed against groups or individuals entirely within the offender's
own state. It is hard to find an ATS suit sounding in UJ where the
defendant and plaintiff hail from different countries. 20 6 Thus the in-
terests of third-party nations are not directly implicated, and their in-
tervention will likely appear as officious intermeddling, or as Judge
Bork put it, 'Judicial imperialism." 20 7 Because foreign human rights
offenders do not threaten U.S. interests in any way that might rise to
self defense, the prudential arguments for dealing with such cases be-
comes much weaker. Moreover, a judicial decision against the de-
fendants in such cases could more likely be perceived as a political
condemnation of the foreign government involved. The foreign rela-
tions concerns do not disappear in ATS cases simply because they are
brought by private litigants rather than public prosecutors. At the
very least, judges make the decisions about whether to allow such
cases to proceed, and possibly whether to impose liability and what
relief to grant. Foreign nations aggrieved by an ATS case can be ex-
pected to hold the United States responsible, and not only the
plaintiff.20 8
Piracy was everywhere punished by death, and thus UJ did not
create forum-shopping possibilities, double jeopardy problems, or set
up potential conflicts between the laws of prosecuting states. Yet
there is little international consensus about appropriate penalties for
the human rights offenses of modern UJ. This has already emerged as
a serious obstacle to broadly implementing modern UJ. For example,
the Rwandan government originally acquiesced to the exercise of UJ
over the Rwandan genocidaires by an international court sitting in Si-
erra Leone. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
206 The exception may be Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), which
involved abuses during the Bosnian civil war when national boundaries were unclear.
207 See Bork, supra note 57.
208 For example, the French government protested vigorously over the potential
exercise of UJ over a French vessel in LaJeune Eugenie, leading Justice Story to turn it
over to France. That case, which inflamed American relations with France, was not a
criminal prosecution but rather a libel in admiralty, though the libeled vessel had
been captured by a U.S. "public armed schooner." United States v. LaJeune Eugenie,
22 F. Cas. 832, 840 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551).
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does not impose capital punishment, while Rwandan courts routinely
executed participants in the genocide. So when the ICTR takes juris-
diction over a defendant, it saves him from the death penalty, creating
obvious opportunities for forum shopping by defendants. 20 9 Indeed,
the worst offenders turned themselves in to the international tribunal,
sparing themselves the death penalty, while lower-level perpetrators in
Rwandan custody were executed. 210 The disparity in punishment in-
furiated the Rwandan government, leading it to break off its relations
with the ICTR and actively interfere with its operations. Similarly, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia originally sought to
track the sentencing practices of the former Yugoslavia, but aban-
doned this approach when it became clear it would require imposing
the death penalty. 211
However, the relevance of these problems to ATS litigation is not
as obvious as with the other defining aspects of piracy. For one, the
United States is one of the only nations that entertains UJ cases of any
kind. Thus differences between, say, American and Russian penalties
are moot because only American ones are in practice available. More-
over, the civil nature of ATS penalties may mitigate the disparate pun-
ishment and double jeopardy problem. Civil recovery avoids
emotional debates about the propriety of the death penalty or the rel-
ative severity of American jail sentences compared to European ones.
A verdict in a civil case does not preclude American criminal proceed-
ings, and it is unclear whether it would have a preclusive effect on
subsequent criminal prosecutions in the courts of other nations. On
the other hand, Justice Breyer's Sosa concurrence suggests that UJ
over tort cases does overlap to a significant extent with criminal UJ
because the civil/criminal distinction is not as bright in other nations.
The "criminal courts of many nations combine civil and criminal pro-
ceedings .... Thus, universal criminal jurisdiction necessarily contem-
plated a significant degree of civil tort recovery as well." 2 12 To the
extent this is the case, civil UJ under the ATS does raise differential
penalty problems, especially given that U.S. courts are particularly at-
209 See Brent Wible, "De-Jeopardizing Justice" Donestic Prosecutions for International
Crimes and the Need for Transnational Convergence, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 265, 274
(2002) (commenting that "a system where a defendant could face the death penalty
in one jurisdiction and life imprisonment in another . .. would seem arbitrary and
undermine the notion of universality").
210 See id. at 274 & n.44.
211 See id. at 273-74.
212 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2783 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(citing Brief for European Commission as Amicus Curiae at 21 n.48, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004) (No. 03-339)).
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tractive for foreign plaintiffs because they award punitive damages,
while most nations' courts do not.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Sosa declared that the ATS is a primarily
jurisdictional statute, but that actions can be brought directly under it
for a narrow set of CIL violations. While the Court did not rule out
the possibility that the ATS provides a cause of action for some mod-
em, human rights-oriented CIL norms, it set a high bar for judicial
recognition of such causes of action. In particular, the Court estab-
lished a historical test under which any new CIL offense must conform
to the characteristics of those few violations of the law of nations that
were directly enforced by eighteenth century common law. The law
of nations only allowed for UJ over piracy, whereas most modern ATS
litigation is based on the universal theory. Thus of the eighteenth
century offenses, piracy is the mold into which modern CIL norms
must fit if they are to serve as causes of action under the ATS.
Yet the new CIL norms do not pass Sosa's historical test. Modern
human rights offenses are not substantially "comparable" to piracy,
the benchmark offense. While the new UJ claims piracy as a prece-
dent and inspiration, it disregards the safeguards and limitations that
made piracy UJ unproblematic and uncontroversial. UJ over human
rights abuses threatens the "adverse foreign policy consequences
213
that Sosa warned of much more than did the "historical paragons"
that ATS actions must resemble. Thus under Sosa, judges should not
create causes of action for the new CIL norms.
213 Id. at 2763.
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